TEMPO SEMANAL

Tempo Semanal Husu Deskulpa ba Leitores

2012-01-14T07:22:00.000-08:00

Tempo Semanal, Dili 14/01/2012

Ho haraik aan manajemen ho fungsionariu Tempo semanal foo hatene ba maluk sira katak jornal nee labele emprime tan ba ami hetan krize orsamentu. Iha fulan nee ami haruka ona jornalista balun fila ba uma tan ba ami la iha orsamentu hodi produz jornal no selu kustu operasionais hotu.

Ami nia fundus sofre tan ba klientes sira selu tarde no balun lakohi selu sira nia tusan. Iha 2011 ami gasta orsamentu ne'ebe boot ba produsaun jornal ba instituisaun estadu Timor Leste maibe too ikus rejeita atu selu nunee ami tenke sakrifika ami nia jornalista no klientes sira nia interese.

Ami husi Manajemen sei halo esforsu atu halo moris fali jornal nee iha tempu oin mai. Maibe ami la iha kbiit atu promete bainhira loos maka ami bele hetan osan naton atu bele halao fali ami nia atividade hanesan uluk.
Ba inkonviniente hotu2 atan ami ho haraik aan hakruk ba imi.

A GEURRA DE MANUFAHI (continuação)

2012-01-14T07:08:00.000-08:00

Os acontecimentos ocorridos nos meses de Maio, Junho Julho de 1912.

Durante aquele mês as forças do governo avançavam lentamente sobre o reduto de Cablac. O governador Filomena da câmara dirigia as operações. Nesse período o governo dispunha de 21 oficiais, 463 soldados de primeira linha, 597 moradores e 7.757 auxiliares. Estes provinham dos reinos de Fatomasi, Liquiçá, Maubara e Maúbo. Estas forças estavam colocadas á volta de Cablac, e iniciam o ataque no dia 25 ou 26 de Maio.

Mas os manufaistas conseguiram levar melhor sobre os atacantes que foram repelidos. Do alto das montanhas sucediam-se avalanchas de rochas que resvalavam pelas encostas. Os auxiliares retiram-se em debandada deixando dois mortos atrás de si. A 27 de Maio quatro colunas apoiadas pela artilharia voltam ao ataque. Da montanha choviam pedras, rochas, flechas e chumbos. Desta vez, as forças governamentais depois de dispararem 405 tiros nos quais foram gastos 20.000 cartuchos, conseguiram desalojar os “rebeldes”que abandonam o Cablac de Aituto.

Além das forças acima referida, o governo da Colónia contava com a canhoeira a Pátria. Comandado pelo novo comandante Gago Coutinho, o navio largou de Díli, no dia 24, para a costa sul transportando carga, mantimentos, armas e munições para as guarnições que cercavam Leo-Laco, uma das quais era comandada pelo capitão do porto de Díli, 1º tenente Manuel Paulo de Sousa Gentil.

Tinha ancorado no taci mane, em frente de Betano. A presença da canhoeira deu apoio decisivo às tropas em terra, onde se encontrava o 2º tenente Mesquita Guimarães. No dia 27 de Maio, o navio bombardeava Leo-Laco com peças de 100 mm. Embora s marinheiros não vissem os danos causados pelos bombardeamentos, contava-se em Díli, algumas bombas caíram na residência da rainha de Betano, onde estavam reunidos vários datos. Parece que houve vítimas naquela localidade.

No dia 29 de Maio, as forças do governo tomavam Ablai.

O navio fez a patrulha à volta de Betano durante sete dias. No dia 4 de Junho a Pátria regressou a Díli, Entretanto, as forças terrestres iam avençando sobre Riac e Leo-Laco. O capitão Azevedo avançou para as rampas de Caicassa, enquanto o governador descia para Rotuto e Ablai-Dum. O comandante Ramalho realizava rondas ao norte de Cablac para garantir a passagem dos arrais para a zona de Hola-Rua.

No dia 4 de Junho os homens de Dom Boaventura abandonaram o acampamento Leo-Mali, em Tarucuamo, lugar que foi imediatamente ocupado pelas guarnições do governo. Tempo depois os portugueses e os seus aliados tomavam o sitio de Tui-Ura. Os diversos destacamentos iam ocupando zonas de Manufahi. Os tenentes Magalhães e Pinto com os arraiais de Liquiçá ocupam Same; O capitão Faure da rosa, à frente dos arraiais de Baucau ocupava Leorai e as regiões mais a sul. No flanco direito de Cablac o tenente Gentil que tinha ido de Suro acabava de acampar em Leo-Lima. No dia 9 de Junho, o governador estabeleceu o acampamento e quartel-general em Raimera.

A região de Raimera era coberta de densa matagal. Ali os manufaistas tinham construído muros de pedra, sebes de bambu e ramos de árvores para impedir a passagem aos malaes. A tomada de Raimera por parte dos portugueses durou três dias. Finalmente no dia 14 de Junho de 1912, o governador conseguiu ocupar Riamera, depois de ter sido apoiado por um pelotão da 8ª companhia, de oradores e arraias de auxiliares.

Na zona sul, o capitão Faure da Rosa à frente dos moradores de Baucau acabavam de ocupar a região de Turon. Entretanto houve lutas renhidas entre os rebeldes e os moradores. Os “rebeldes” chegavam a atacar de note os postos de Tir-Guer entre Turon e Tir-Ai.

Nos dias 15 e 16 de Junho, as forças do governo punham cerco a Riac que conseguiu resistir até o dia 16 de Julho. Nesse fatídico dia Riac rendeu-se. Foram feitos prisioneiros 4.500 manufaistas. Os valorosos “rebeldes” entregaram 342 espingardas milhares de catanas e azagaias. Mas Leo-Laco continuava inexpugnável! Nesse monte lulic Dom Boaventura iria resistir até Agosto de 1912.

Porto, 13 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES BELO

A GUERRA DE MANUFAHI (VII)

2012-01-14T06:54:00.000-08:00

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

Como dissemos nas crónicas anteriores que durante os meses de Fevereiro e Março do ano de 1912, estavam decorrer as operações contra o reino de Manufahi.

O avanço das forças governamentais apoiadas por arraiais dos comandos militares ia tornando mais difícil a vida dos timorenses em rebelião. As áreas de Cablac ocupadas pelos “manufaistas” iam-se tornando mais estreitas. Dom Boaventura da Costa, a família e muito povo encontravam-se entrincheirados nas fortalezas de Riac e leo-Laco.

As consequências da guerra eram várias: aldeias abandonadas, casas incendiadas, roubo de gado; abandono de culturas (café, milho e arroz), doenças, fome, e morte. Tanto da parte dos rebeldes como doas forças governamentais havia muitos feridos e dezenas de mortos. Fizeram-se dezenas de prisões. Na Praça de Díli, em 1912, havia mais de 4 mil prisioneiros na cadeia.

Mas, não era só à volta de Cablac que decorriam as operações contra os rebeldes. Na região de Bobonaro as forças do governo realizaram vários “raids” contras as populações. Houve operações à volta de Bobonaro, Atabae, Atsabe, Hatolia e Cailaco. Essas operações tinham o objectivo de eliminar possíveis revoltosos e de impedir a sua passagem até Manufahi. Mesmo assim, os portugueses registaram entre as suas fileiras, 30 mortos e uma centena de feridos.

Sucedeu, então que em vários reinos, sobretudo, da parte ocidental, muitas pessoas começaram abandonaram as suas aldeias, procurando refúgio nos reinos vizinhos ou no território de Timor holandês.

Famílias inteiras de Atsabe, Leimean, Deribate Cailaco dirigiam-se para Memo e para a fronteira. O êxodo destas famílias ocorreu nos dias 9 e 10 de Maio de 1912. Foi nesta ocasião, que o régulo de Memo, Bere-Tali perpetrou o massacre contra os fugitivos, nas margens do rio Malibaca. Segundo o Relatório das Forças da Fronteira, o régulo e os seus homens mataram mais de 100 pessoas, entre as quais 6 chefes. Nos fins de Maio, na povoação de Sadi, no território holandês, havia 2.000 refugiados timorenses.

Conta-se que em Atsabe, as pessoas preferiram morrer de fome e de sede nos seus esconderijos a entregar-se às forças governamentais. Conta-se ainda que os timorenses fiéis ao governo, numa das suas campanhas pelas aldeias, cortaram mais de 300 cabeças aos seus inimigos.

O corte de cabeças era um acto de valentia. Morto o inimigo, a cabeça é decepada e levada para o acampamento. Os acampamentos das tropas em Maubisse estavam enfeitados com cabeças cortadas.

No mês de Abril de 1912, Dom Boaventura escreveu ao governador Filomeno da Câmara apresentando as condições da sua rendição. Mas o malea boot (embot) não fez caso do pedido e continuou a reforçar as suas posições no terreno.

No dia 29 desse mês chegavam a Díli mais reforços. Tinha atracado um navio português que levava a 9ª Companhia de soldados moçambicanos, (seis oficias, 14 sargentos e 233 soldados). Metade dessa companhia seria encaminhada para Suro, via Liquiça, Hatolia e Atsabe.

A REVOLTA DE AMBENO (Continuação

2012-01-14T06:14:00.000-08:00

Pelo Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A revolta de Ambeno iniciada pelo régulo Dom João da Cruz Ornai deu-se no dia 22 de Março e não no dia 25, como eu tinha escrito na crónica anterior. Recebia a notícia da revolta em Díli no dia 26 de Março de 1912, o governo decide mandar a canhoeira a Pátria a Oe-Cusse com o objectivo de dominar os revoltosos. Aprontou-se o navio que transportou uma força de 40 soldados moçambicanos e 3 sargentos sob o comando do tenente de infantaria Sérgio Morais e Castro e 31 moradores de Baucau, tendo à frente o alferes Afonso da Costa. Pelas 16.00 horas do dia 28 largava o navio para Pante Macassar. Em Batugadé, embarcaram o tenente Jorge Figueiredo de Barros, comandante militar de Oe-Cusse, o régulo Dom Hugo da Costa, alguns chineses e 25 moradores, todos fugitivos de Pante Macassar no dia dos ataques dos homens de Ambeno. (Na crónica anterior eu tinha dito que o padre António de Morais também tinha seguido para Batugadé, mas cometi um lapso, afinal ele estava em Oe-Cusse).

Tendo o navio a Pátria chegado em frente da vila, viram um beiro a dirigir-se para o navio conduzindo o missionário Padre António Januário de Morais e um timorense que relataram ao comandante do navio factos ali ocorridos.

Entretanto deu-se o desembarque das forças. Os portugueses ao aproximarem-se da terra, foram recebidos pelos “revoltosos” com haklalas e tiros. Pelas setes horas, a canhoeira abriu fogo com as peças de Hotchkiss e fuzilaria.

Da terra, os “ambenos” entre 500 a mil 1.000 homens, respondiam com tiros de espingarda Remington que tinham roubado no posto. Fez-se o desembarque das forças que foram ocupando posições em terra. Na troca de tiros ficaram feridos dois moçambicanos. Do navio fez-se o bombardeamento da povoação. Os moradores iam deitando fogo às casas. Nas matas que cercavam a povoação de Pante Macassar pululavam os “revoltosos”. A rainha de Oe-Cusse e algumas mulheres e crianças procuraram o abrigo no navio.

A “reconquista” de Pante Macassar durou dois dias. Nessa acção empregaram-se bombardeamentos com 10 granadas ordinárias e 10 granadas ordinárias, e 2.600 cartuchos de carabinas. Os portugueses reocuparam a casa do comando. Entretanto generalizou o incêndio pelas restantes casas de Oe-Cusse. Ao meio-dia do terceiro dia, o comandante, acompanhado de dois oficiais foi à terra iças bandeira verde-rubra.

E o que aconteceu a Dom João da Cruz Ornai? Vendo o destacamento de guerreiros ambenos derrotado e desfeito, o liurai tomou o caminho do exílio e foi viver com a sua família na povoação de Lelogama (então território holandês). Em Dezembro de 1912, o governador holandês, no seu périplo por alguns regulados de Timor holandês encontrou ali os irmãos da Cruz Ornay, “homens educados em Dili”. Seria dom João e o irmão? Ou seriam os filhos?

Todo o enclave de Oe-Cusse e Ambeno seria totalmente ocupado depois da guerra de Manufahi, facto que só aconteceu em 1913.

Dom João da Cruz Ornai era filho de Dom Pedro, rei de Tul-Ikan, e neto de Dom Bernardo. Teria nascido por volta de 1888. Em 1907 foi enviado a Soibada, onde fez a instrução primária no Colégio Nun’Álvares, então dirigido pelos padres Jesuítas. Diz-se que em 1908, ele casou com Bi Sani Taeki Meko.

Durante a guerra japonesa (1942-1945), Dom João da Cruz Ornai voltou a Oe-Cusse tentando ocupar o lugar de liurai. Mas as autoridades portugueses não viram bem essa iniciativa, e, relembrando a revolta de 1912, obrigaram-no a regressar a Kefamenanu (TTU) onde viria a falecer em 1961. Teria 73 anos.

Porto, 11 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A REVOLTA DE AMBENO (1912)

2012-01-10T04:43:00.000-08:00

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

Ao mesmo tempo que decorria a campanha contra o reino de Manufahi, no dia 25 de Março de 1912, começava em Ambeno uma revolta chefiada pelo régulo Dom João da Cruz Ornay. Os motivos dessa revolta? Eram vários e complexas. Mas a principal razão era a maneira pouco prudente como foi tratado o régulo de Ambeno pelo comandante de O-Cusse.

Conta-se que o liurai tinha uma irmã que se dizia formosa e prendada pela educação que recebera no Colégio das Irmãs canossianas em Dili. Aconteceu que o sargento dos moradores de Lacló, em serviço em Pante Makasar, apaixonou-se pela irmã do régulo e pediu-lhe em casamento. Dom João Ornay não concordou com essa proposta e, mandou castigar uma criada que servia de intermediária na troca de “cartas de amor” entre a princesa e o sargento. Sabedor do facto o comandante militar chamou ao comando Dom João Ornay e repreendeu-o diante de outros chefes e ameaçando-o com palmatoadas e prisão. “O régulo conservando-se calado, ouviu-o e chorou; levado o incidente ao conhecimento dos demais chefes, deliberaram todos tirar vingança”.

Aconteceu que o sargento Manuel Carlos Rodrigues (malae) se encontrava em Nucheno (actual Padiai). Os timorenses descobriram-no a descansar numa casa. Os homens de régulo amarraram-no com um cordas e, em seguida torturaram-no até à morte. O sargento depois de ter sido amarrado, “o régulo sentou-se em cima dele e, com uma pedra, foi-lhe partindo os dentes e a cara, passando depois a cortar-lhe os dedos dos pés e das mãos que distribuíram uns pelos outros, ao mesmo tempo que exclamavam: - este era o dedo que me dava bofetadas, este o que me dava pontapés, mas agora já não nos dão mais!

A seguir, cortaram-lhe os outros membros, até que morreu no meio de horroroso sofrimentos”. Era o dia 25 de Março de 1912.

Horas depois, Dom João Ornay saiu a encontrar-se com o segundo malae o sargento João Bernardino que ia a caminho de Oe-Cusse. “Ao vê-lo convidou-o a apear-se do cavalo para ir ver um porco gordo que tinha acabado de matar”. “O sargento não queira demorar-se mas acedeu ao convite. Apenas se apeou passaram-lhe uma corda ao pescoço para o prenderem, despiram-no e mataram-no pelo mesmo processo, apesar dos rogos e das súplicas das vítimas. Foi feito em bocados, conservando-lhe a cabeça, á qual arrancaram o coiro cabeludo para fazerem estilo.” [1]

Depois destes crimes, Dom João Ornay dirigiu-se ao comando militar do posto de Wine (Timor Holandês) e pediu auxilio. Quando o comandante lhe perguntou o que queria, o régulo respondeu” Fazer guerra até morrer”. O comandante holandês concordou com a ideia do régulo e até lhe disse mais: “se não se aguentar com eles, e precisar, acolha-se aqui”. O comandante convidou ainda o missionário de Oe-Cusse, padre António Januário de Morais para se acolher na região de Hau-Mene.[2]

Os homens de Ambeno conseguiram entrar no reino de Oe-Cusse obrigando o Régulo Dom Hugo da Costa, o comandante militar, o tenente de infantaria Jorge de Figueiredo de Barros, dois europeus e alguns chineses e 25 moradores a fugirem num beiro para Batugadé.

Por causa destes factos, o governo português tomou a decisão de enviar ao enclave a canhoeira Pátria para repor a ordem e a soberania.

[1] Jaime do Inso, Timor-1912, p. 84.

[2] Idem, p. 85.

Porto, 9 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A GUERRA DE MANFAHI – 2ª Fase – continuação

2012-01-06T17:24:00.000-08:00

Pelo Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A segunda fase ou o segundo período da guerra durou cerca de quatro meses (Fevereiro a Junho).

Os “rebeldes” tinham atacado várias povoações com o intuito de travar o avanço das forças do governo. Nalgumas zonas por eles controladas haviam recolhido mantimentos, bens e gado no alto nas serras (fohon tutun).

O governador Filomeno da Câmara e os seus homens estavam decididos em avançar para Cablac combatendo os rebeldes no seu terreno. Mas devido à configuração do terreno e à existência de vários grupos de rebeldes espalhados pela região, foi preciso fazer primeiro o reconhecimento do terreno. As forças governamentais avançavam para Cablac em três frentes. Da zona Leste, com arrais comandados pelo capitão José Faure da Rosa; da zona oeste, os arraiais sob o comando do tenente António Valente de Almeida; da zona norte, o próprio governo e o seu quartel-general.

Nos dias 28 e 29 de Fevereiro e no dia 1 de Março de 1912, o reconhecimento do terreno foi efectuado pelo batalhão do Tenente Almeida e do padre Manuel Alves Ferreira, missionário de Maubara. Perto de Maubisse, travou-se o combate e uma bala inimiga tirou a vida ao padre Ferreira. O padre expirou às duas de madrugada do dia 2 de Março.

No dia 3, sai de Soibada, o destacamento do capitão Faure da Rosa ia exploras as regiões de Terás. Nesse destacamento ia como voluntário o padre Manuel Laranjeira, missionário de Soibada.

Entretanto na zona norte, o governador ordenava o reconhecimento das regiões de Manucate, Hatobessi, Maulau, Lequidoe e Turiscai.

No dia 7 de Março realizou-se a exploração das regiões de Manucate. Nesse tempo os rebeldes dominava as povoações de Tumau e Hatobessi. No dia 15, as forças governamentais fazem assalto ao monte de Tumau. Nesse monte os timorenses tinham levado para lá todos os seus bens, incluindo o gado: búfalos, cavalos e cabritos. Pela força das armas, os rebeldes foram obrigados a sair dos esconderijos deixando para trás muitos animais. Os moradores dos arraiais apoderaram-se de 112 búfalos e de alguns cavalos.

No dia 25 de Março, as tropas de capitão Faure da Rosa, depois de renhido combate, ocupava Fatu-Boi (Fatu Boe).[1] Nesta campanha as forças governamentais eram formadas por arrais de Samoro sob o comando de Liria Vidal Sarmento, e os arrais de Vemasse, Laleia, Cairui. Luna de Oliveira descreve assim Fatu-Boi, depois dos combates: “Fatu-Boi, posição naturalmente inexpugnável, sulcada em sucessivas linhas defensiva, biseladas na rocha, atravanca de arvoredo frondoso, era um cemitério ao ar livre. O cheiro pestilento, mal inumados empestava o ar. Cabeças dos mortos espreitavam á flor da terra, tal fora a pressa com que os enterraram” (Luna, III, p. 122). Depois dessa acção as forças tomaram sem dificuldade Dotic e Sarim[2]. O chefe do Suco Laca-Dala-Nai sucumbiu ao combate. A cabeça foi decepada e levada ao acampamento dos malae como troféu. Nesse período ocupou-se Fatuberliu. No mês de Abril de 1912, as regiões a leste de Same estavam submetidas (Alas, Bibiçuço).

Na zona oeste alguns reinos estavam em rebelião. O reino de Cailaco persistia na rebelião e tentava seduzir outros reinos, como o de Atabai, o régulo Bere-Talo. Contra Bere-Talo, o capitão Fonseca Cardoso, comandante militar de Batugadé organizou uma campanha que decorreu entre os dias 3 e 10 de Março. O destacamento comandado pelo sargento Humberto Maria Fernandes era composto por 35 moradores.

Na zona sul (Suro) o destacamento composto por 50 soldados, 2 voluntários e 107 moradores controlavam as regiões de circunvizinhas à vila não impedindo a incursão dos “manufahistas.”

Entre os dias 17 e 27 de Março Atabai era atacada pelas forças do Capitão Fonseca Cardoso. Nessa operação participaram 456 homens: soldados do esquadrão de cavalaria da fronteira, soldados moçambicanos e um pequeno arraial de moradores de Balibó. Os rebeldes de Cailaco não queriam render-se pois declaravam que preferiam morrer nas montanhas e nos rios do que serem portugueses.

Em Manufahi, Dom Boaventura da Costa Souto Maior sentia-se mais isolado pois não recebeu mais adesões de novos reinos. Os seus homens, além de continuarem em sentinela nas zonas fronteiriças, iam consolidando as fortificações de defesa em Riac e Leo-Laco.

Mas na segunda metade do mês de Março de 1912, o governo viu revoltar-se Dom João da Cruz Hornay, régulo de Ambeno. A revolta de Ambeno será o tema do capítulo a seguir.

Porto, 6 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

[1] Fatu Boe, povoação pertencente ao suco de Fatu Cahi, Sub-Distrito de Fatuberliu.

[2] Sarim, povoação pertencente a Alas e fazia baliza com o rio (mota) Clere.

A EDUCAÇÃO PARA O RESPEITO DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS

2012-01-06T05:06:00.000-08:00

Pelo Bispo, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A educação para Paz é um processo que deve mostra outra visão da guerra com o fim de evitar que o fenómeno bélico seja considerado como algo normal e inevitável. A educação para paz não é tanto atingir objectivos literários ou científicos mas para formar a pessoa nos valores éticos.

Em 1974 a conferência geral da UNESCO publicou uma recomendação sobre a educação para a compreensão e educação relativa aos direitos do homem e às liberdades fundamentais. A Organização das nações unidas proclamou em 1994, a década para a Educação dos Direitos Humanos (1994-2004). Apesar de todos estes apelos da ONU, muitas violações de direitos humanos continuam a registar-se no mundo. Assistimos ao longo de décadas a ocorrência de guerras, prisões torturas, violência doméstica, discriminação racial, étnica e religiosa. Em várias partes do mundo continua a haver o comércio de seres humanos, a destruição do meio ambiente, exploração abusiva de recursos naturais.

É urgente gritar bem alto neste século XXI, é preciso respeitar os direitos humanos! É urgente educar as crianças, os jovens e os adultos para o respeito dos direitos humanos. Para que no mundo não haja mais guerras, exploração do homem pelo homem, descriminação sob todas as formas, são urgentes e importantes programas de educação para os direitos humanos.

A educação para os direitos humanos consiste no conhecimento, na informação, aprendizagem e na prática do respeito pelos direitos de cada pessoa e de cada povo. Só assim podemos ter um mundo mais humano, mais fraterno e mais pacífico.

Em primeiro lugar importa conhecer o que são os direitos humanos. Direitos humanos são direitos inerentes à natureza humana, anteriores e superiores aos ordenamentos políticos e jurídicos de qualquer Estado e que são reconhecidos na actualidade por todos os regimes democráticos. Fala-se de direitos fundamentais do homem, porque procedem do mais profundo da condição humana e deles derivam sucessivamente outros. Os direitos humanos, além de serem fundamentais, são universais, invioláveis e inalienáveis.

Os direitos humanos são universais, porque estão presentes em todos os seres humanos, se excepção alguma de tempo, do lugar e sujeito. São invioláveis enquanto ‘inerentes à pessoa humana e à sua dignidade, e porque seria em vão proclamar os direitos se simultaneamente não fizéssemos esforços a fim de que seja devidamente assegurado o seu respeito por parte de todos e em toda a parte e em relação a quem que seja. São inalienáveis, enquanto ninguém pode legitimamente violentar a sua natureza. Estes direitos hão-de ser tutelados não só em cada um singularmente, mas no seu conjunto.

Para uma melhor compreensão dos direitos humanos, podemos agrupá-los de seguinte modo:

Direitos do homem (e da mulher) como ser vivo: direito a nascer (todo o indivíduo tem direito à vida); direito à integridade física e psíquica (ninguém será submetido à tortura); direito à alimentação, vestuário, à habitação, repouso, assistência sanitária.

Direitos como pessoa humana: direito ao desenvolvimento físico, afectivos, intelectual, moral, artístico e religioso. Direito á estima, ao respeito à fama, direito a ser livre (direito á liberdade9, direito à igualdade).

Direitos como ser familiar: direito a constituir família; direito á educação dos filhos; direito á estabilidade, independência e intimidade da família e do casal.

Direitos do homem como cidadão: direito à participação na vida pública; direito à liberdade de reunião e associação; direito á manifestação e difusão de pensamento; direito à informação verídica sobre os acontecimentos políticos; direito ás justiça. À segurança física e à defesa dos seus direitos; direito à liberdade de domicílio dentro e fora do país.

Direitos do homem como trabalhado: direito ao trabalho, direito à qualificação técnica e profissional; direito á retribuição justa (remuneração equitativa e satisfatória); direito à participação na vida da empresa; direito a condições de trabalho, direito a não ser desempatado no caso de desemprego forçado, direito ao descanso.

Direito como ser religioso (art. 18).

Entretanto sabemos todos que os nossos direitos acabam onde começa o direito das outras pessoas. Daqui a importância da educação para personalizar os próprios deveres. Deveres de respeitar os pais, os professores, as autoridades, as diferenças de género, de cultura, de religião, de raça, etc. Os direitos e os deveres são como que as duas faces da mesma moeda. Não existem direitos exclusivos. Onde há direitos há deveres. No campo da proclamação dos direitos haverá sempre deveres correspondentes.

Porto, 5 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

XANANA MEMILIH: Taur atau Lasama?

2012-01-05T08:01:00.000-08:00

Filipe Rodrigues Pereira^*)

Kampanye untuk pemilihan Presiden Republik (PR) di Timor-Leste masih beberapa bulan lagi, akan tetapi kampanye terselubung untuk saling menjatuhkan satu sama lain sudah mulai terasa sejak beberapa bulan lalu hingga saat ini. Serangan antar pendukung figur presiden yang dicatat memanas di media massa pada akhir tahun lalu dipicu oleh sebuah artikel yang ditulis oleh sdr. Jose Maria Guterres dengan judul “TL-1 dan Berkah Xanana Gusmao” yang pada intinya menyatakan bahwa PR pada 2012 mendatang adalah figur yang memperoleh berkah dari Xanana Gusmao, dan figur tersebut diyakini sdr. Jose Guterres adalah Taur Matan Ruak.

Menanggapi artikel sdr. Jose M. Guterres tersebut diatas muncul sebuah artikel tanggapan dari sdr. Joanico Moreira yang membantah keyakinan Jose M. Guterres, bahwa Xanana belum tentu memberkahi Taur dan jika diberkahipun belum tentu Taur bisa menang karena Xanana hanya memiliki satu suara, tidak lebih dari itu. Meskipun sdr. Morreira menyepelehkan Xanana, yakni dengan mengatakan Xanana hanya memiliki satu suara, tetapi pada bagian lain artikelnya sangat terkesan sdr. Morreira mengharapkan pula berkah Xanana kepada Fernando Lasama, hal ini tersirat pada kalimat-kalimat yang menghubungkan kedekatan Fernando Lasama dan Xanana di masa lalu, loyalitas Lasama kepada Xanana. Juga, dapat dilihat pula pernyataan seperti, apabila Xanana ingin memerintah lagi pada 2012 maka perlu mendorong kandidat dari tubuh AMP. Di sini terkesan sdr. Morreira memiliki pandangan yang mendua, satu sisi menyepelehkan eksistensi politik Xanana dengan mengatakan Xanana hanya memiliki satu suara tetapi pada sisi yang lain mengharapkan sekali dukungan Xanana pada Lasama de Araujo untuk menjadi PR pada 2012.

Penulis ingin menyatakan bahwa menghargai Xanana dengan satu suara (um voto) dalam perpolitikan Timor-Leste adalah pandangan yang ‘menyesatkan’, terlalu menyederhanakan masalah. Adalah keliru jika hanya menghitung satu suara yang dimiliki Xanana pada saat Pemilu, perlu memandang Xanana sebagai sebuah totalitas, pengaruh dan kekuasaanya dalam konteks sosial-politik Timor-Leste. Hal mana diakui oleh Dr. Mari Alkatiri pada berbagai kesempatan bahwa stabiltas nasional Timor-Leste sangat ditentukan oleh Fretilin dan Xanana, bukan CNRT. Jadi ketokohan Xanana diakui oleh pemimpin oposisi. Juga ketokohannya diakui pula oleh beberapa fungsionaris PD sendiri, bahwa PD sampai dengan saat ini masih hidup dalam bayang-bayang Xanana. Mungkin saja PD sewaktu mendukung Ramos-Horta pada putaran kedua pada Pemilu 2007 karena pengaruh atau faktor Xanana atau karena faktor lain, bukan karena keinginan murni kepemimpinan PD.

Dan, ke depan PD akan tetap bersama Xanana atau tidak akan tergantung pada kedua belah pihak. Apakah masing-masing pihak masih ingin mempertahankan komposisi aliansi/koalisi seperti AMP saat ini?! Akankah AMP akan tetap solid dan berlanjut pada 2012?! Atau dengan pengalaman yang ada pada AMP maka Xanana atau PD ingin beraliansi dengan partai di luar AMP aktual?!

Berkaitan dengan perihal aliansi, sdr. Armindo Mauk-Sun Guterres sebagaimana dalam artikelnya yang dipublikasikan Forum-Haksesuk mengatakan bahwa lebih rasional apabila Xanana dan CNRTnya mendukung Lasama sebagai PR pada 2012 karena PD akan memiliki kursi signifikan di Parlemen, tentu dimaksudkan jika suara CNRT tidak memadai maka PD yang akan menopangnya. Pertanyaannya, apakah Taur akan duduk diam dalam pemilihan legislatif jika Xanana dan CNRT mendukung pencalonannya?! jangan-jangan dalam Pemilu legislatif Taur malah menyeruhkan pendukungnya untuk memilih CNRT?! Atau telah ada ancang-ancang bahwa dengan melihat kondisi Xanana yang kurang sehat maka ke depan CNRT akan meminang Taur untuk memegang pucuk pimpinan CNRT?! Hal ini bisa saja terjadi karena di satu sisi Taur dalam ‘kampanye’ PRnya terlihat sangat peduli untuk mengubah sesegera kondisi ekonomi masyarakat, mereformasi birokrasi dan hal-hal lain yang menjadi wewenang pemerintah, di sisi lain kepemimpinan Taur nantinya pada pucuk pimpinan CNRT diyakini beberapa pihak dapat mengimbangi kekuatan partai Fretilin ke depan.

Mengikuti perkembangan perpolitikan Timor-Leste menjelang pemilihan PR 2012 maka orang selalu ingin mengetahui Taur telah memperoleh dukungan politik dari siapa saja, dan Xanana ada di pihak mana. Dari pengamatan Penulis, sementara ini Taur diyakini masih menjadi yang terkuat sehingga tudingan dan serangan pada dirinya datang bertubi-tubi. Salah satu tudingan yang dialamatkan pada Taur adalah datang juga dari sdr. Armindo Mauk-Sun Guterres yang pada intinya mengeksplor kekurangan Taur. Misalnya, Taur dinilai calon presiden yang alergi akan kritikan, deskriminatif. Akhir bulan Desember 2011 muncul lagi satu artikel tanggapan dari sdr. Alfredo Mau-Redo Ramos da Silva (Mau-Redo) atas kedua artikel yang ditulis oleh sdr. Morreira dan Mauk-Sun. Artikel Mau-Redo ini membeberkan apa yang disebutnya sebagai kelemahan dari Presiden Partai Demokrat, Fernando Lasama.

Sebelum masuk pada ulasan lebih lanjut, yang menggelitik penulis adalah mengapa ketiga rekan yang menulis artikel menyangkut Taur dan Lasama sebagaimana tersebut diatas tidak menampakkan diri apa adanya, namun bersembunyi dibalik nama-nama palsu?! Mengapa ketiganya tidak berani menampakkan diri?! Apa gerangan?! Ketiganya masih memiliki hubungan keluarga dengan Taur dan Lasama?! Atau karena ketakutan akan analisis yang disampaikan kurang atau tidak sahih?! Atau karena Taur maupun Lasama adalah orang-orang “angker” yang tidak siap dikritik itulah yang menjadi penyebabnya?! Kritik atas Taur dan Lasama di republik ini akan mendatangkan kematian?! Atau ketiganya ingin mendapatkan rasa nyaman dimana saja, nyaman di samping Taur dan enak di sisi Lasama?!

Soal Taur alergi atas kritik, dalam beberapa hal penulis memiliki pula pandangan bahwa sampai dengan saat ini Taur belum saja terbiasa dengan dunia politik orang sipil. Kehidupan Taur sebagai panglima tentara yang selalu hidup dalam garis komando selama 30tahun membawa dirinya bersikap reaktif menghadapi perbedaan pandangan sebagaimana kasus Manuel Tilman beberapa bulan lalu. Namun adalah berlebihan jika muncul kekawatiran bahwa nantinya Taur akan berusaha menutupi mulut orang-orang yang mengkritik dirinya jika terpilih menjadi PR. Menurut Penulis, Taur bukan seorang yang anti demokrasi. Dalam kepemimpinannya, F-FDTL secara baik dan elok mendundukkan diri pada supremasi sipil. Hanya saja dalam krisis politik-militer 2006 lalu F-FDTL yang dipimpinnya tercoreng, tetapi itupun karena usaha orang-orang sipil, termasuk beberapa politisi yang ikut memperalat institusi militer dan polisi. Perlu dicatat, meski diterpa krisis politik-militer pada 2006 lalu, dengan sikap nasionalisnya Taur tidak jatuh dan mencoba mengkudeta pemerintah yang dipilih secara demokratis pada pemilu pertama republik ini. Menyangkut sikap Taur yang reaktif dan dinilai beberapa pihak sebagai figur yang tidak siap dikritik, disarankan ke depan Taur dapat membentuk kelompok diskusi kecil yang selalu siap sparing atau berdebat, mendiskusikan semua hal, dengan demikian dapat membantu mengantarnya masuk pada dunia politik orang sipil yang sebenarnya.

Menyangkut sentimen regionalisme-etnik yang dikaitkan pada Taur, Penulis ingin menyatakan bahwa meski sebuah kebetulan tetapi Taur telah menunjukkan secara nyata lewat dirinya, ia telah menyatukan kedua wilayah Lorosae-Loromonu dalam darah dagingnya, yakni melalui anak-anaknya. Itulah keutuhan nyata Timoris yang ditunjukkan Taur melalui keluarganya. Bukti bahwa Taur memiliki semangat Timoris yang utuh ditunjukkan pula melalui kasus Abilio Mausoko. Sebagaimana diketahui bahwa pada krisis politik-militer 2006, Abilio Mausoko dengan kelompoknya menyerang kediaman Taur. Tetapi apa yang terjadi, di pengadilan sewaktu Abilo Mausoko diadili, Taur datang memberikan kesaksian meringankan dan membuka pintu maaf bagi terdakwa Abilio. Begitu pula dengan Major Alfredo Reinaldo (almarhum), sampai kematian menjemputnya almarhum masih menganggap Taur sebagai panglimanya, maka tidak ada alasan untuk mengaitkan Taur dengan sentimen etnik.

Berbicara dukungan Xanana akan diberikan kepada Lasama atau kepada Taur pada pencalonan PR 2012, selain tergantung pada alasan politik sebagaimana telah disampaikan oleh sdr. José M. Guterres, sdr. Joanico Morreira, sdr. Mauk-Sun Guterres dan sdr. Alfredo Mau-Redo dalam artikel mereka pada tahun lalu, Penulis juga ingin mengingatkan bahwa bisa saja alasan kemanusiaan seorang Xananapun akan ikut menentukan siapa yang akan didukungnya. Xanana bisa saja mengatakan, Lasama, kamu telah saya antar menjadi Presiden Parlemen Nasional pada 2007 lalu, kini izinkanlah saya untuk membantu mengantar kakakmu, Taur Matan Ruak untuk menjadi Presiden Republik pada 2012.*** End**

*) Observador Politika no Sosial, Sobrevivente husi Komite 12 de Novembro, Dosente iha Programa Postgraduasaun, Unpaz, Dili.

A GUERRA DE MANUFAHI

2012-01-05T07:28:00.000-08:00

PRIMEIRA FASE DA GUERRA

Para a grande revolta de 1911 e 19112, o Régulo Dom Boaventura havia estabelecido contactos com vários reinos: Atabae, Atsabe, Cailaco, Deribate, Ermera, Matata, Punilala, Suai, Leimean, Bibuçuço, Alas, Turiscai, Lequidoe, Raimean, Suai, Cová, etc.

No mês de Janeiro de 1912, várias povoações revoltaram-se abertamente contra o governo. Fontes portuguesas falam de levantamentos em Manucate, Lequidoe, Hatobessi, Fatuboro, Babulo, Tumau, Babulo, Loto-Po, Alas, Leolima, Aituto. Os combatentes de Manufahi e seus aliados, exibiam a antiga bandeira azul branca (da Monarquia portuguesa), ao passo que as forças governamentais exibiam a nova bandeira, verde-rubra, adoptada pelo novo Regime republicano.

O governador Filomeno da Câmara prevendo um levantamento geral, toma a iniciativa de ocupar Aileu e Maubisse para travar o avanço dos rebeldes sobre a Praça de Díli.

O dia 5 de Janeiro de 1912 marcou o começo das operações contra os rebeldes Manufaistas. Nesse dia, o tenente António Joaquim de Almeida encontra-se em Suro para defender aquela povoação e rechaçar os ataques dos rebeldes de Manufahi. No dia 6, teve de regressar a Hatolia, porque tinha começado uma rebelião chefiada pelo antigo régulo D. António, que foi morto no local. Em meados de Janeiro, o tenente Almeida reúne um contingente formado por um oficial, seis sargentos, dois soldados europeus, 260 moradores e cinco voluntários europeus e auxiliares de Deribate, Maúbo, Maubara e Fatumasi. Nesse contingente incorporou-se o missionário de Maubara, o padre Manuel Ferreira.

No dia 12 daquele mês parte o primeiro contingente de forças governamentais para Aileu sob o comando próprio governador. No dia 17, os revoltosos pretendem atacar Aileu, mas denunciados pelo chefe do suco de Saboria, Brás, são rechaçados. No dia 19, registam-se combates entre “revoltosos” e moradores fiéis ao governo, nas balizas de Bibiçuço. Foi preciso mobilizar contingentes de Alas, Betano e Manufahi, para combater os rebeldes naquela zona. Desse combate em Bibiçuço, registaram quinze mortos do lado dos “revoltoso e 2 do lado do governo.

Para dominar Bibuçuço, o governo mobilizou 2.950 combatentes de Vemasse, Laclubar, Samoro, Laleia, Cairui, Ossú, Ossoroa e Venilale. Os arraiais governamentais eram comandados por um alferes e um sargento e marchavam ostentando a bandeira real portuguesa.

A 31 de Janeiro libertam as zonas circundantes da Missão de Soibada. A 4 e 5 de Fevereiro esses arrais fizeram tal chacina, que segundo um cronista, o massacre dos rebeldes dava para encher um rio.

Por outro lado, na zona de Ermera, na povoação de Umboe, o comandante de Hatolia, António de Almeida Valente conseguiu dominar uma revolta que eclodiu naquela zona matando 66 rebeldes. Almeida Valente recebe ordens do governador para marchar com todas as suas forças sobre Aileu. Parte para Aileu a 29 de Janeiro mas antes disso, reforça a defesa de Ermera, Hatolia e Atsabe com guarnições que reuniam mais de 340 moradores.

Nos princípios do mês de Fevereiro de 1912, o governo reuniu em Aileu oito oficiais, 51 soldados da 1ª linha, 14 voluntários, 364 moradores e 2070 timorenses (irregulares). Provavelmente a 1 ou 2 de Fevereiro, as forças governamentais marcharam m sobre Lelai e no dia 3 fizeram escalada em Rai-Rema. Resultados Dos combates travados entre os “revoltosos e forças leais ao governo: Da parte dos timorenses revoltoso, registaram-se 360 mortos e 320 feridos, Da parte do governo, houve 24 mortos e 33 feridos.

Porto, 4 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A GUERRA DE MANUFAHI – SEGUNDA FASE

Prevendo o avanço das forças governamentais e as movimentações dos arraiais de moradores da 2ª linha que iam chegando à região de Manufhai, Dom Boaventura manda os seus homens controlar os todos os acessos ao monte Cablac e às colinas de Riac e Leo-Laco. Nesse sentido os timorenses em rebelião armados de catanas, diman e algumas espingardas estabelecem postos de vigia nos altos dos montes e colinas, nas encruzilhas dos caminhos, e ao longo de regatos e rios. No alto das serras os “revoltoso” tinham amontoado pedras e pedregulhos para lançarem sobre os malaes e seus aliados quando avançassem por aqueles carreiros. Foi assim que as tropas governamentais tiveram algumas baixas e o próprio governador Filomeno da Câmara ficou ferido chegando ao ponto de ser capturado na zona de Aituto. Num dos recontros os manufaistas apoderaram de um canhão das forças governamentais.

Nesse início de guerra os nativos conheciam os recônditos das localidades: grutas, buracos, precipícios, ravinas, curvas e contra-curvas. Ao divisarem a aproximação do inimigo, utilizavam códigos para se comunicarem com outros: Essa comunicação consistia nos assobios, sopro de chifres do búfalo e através de fogueiras. Por outro lado os male muitn e seus aliados avançavam com dificuldade no terreno. Os meses de Janeiro, Fevereiro e Março eram a época de chuvas. Havia enxurradas e deslizes de terra; nevoeiro na zona de Cablac era intenso e o frio arrepiante. A viagem tinha de ser feita a pé ou de cavalo. Na altura ainda não havia carros de combate, nem camiões ou unimogues.

O Governador sabia que não era fácil chegar a Same para repor a soberania e ordem e prender o régulo de Manufahi. Por isso, além de ordenar o alistamento de moradores de todo o território, pediu ajuda ao Governo de Lisboa e de Macau.

Como resultado dessa diligência, no dia 6 de Fevereiro chega a Díli a canhoeira Pátria sob o comando do tenente Jaime Inso. No dia 11 do mesmo mês desembarcou em Díli a Companhia Europeia da Índia que transportada a bordo do navio inglês St. Albans. A força consistia em três oficiais e 75 soldados, dos quais 35 eram europeus, sendo o restante contingente composto por jovens mestiços da índia e goeses. Estes soldados indianos foram expedidos no dia 13 para Manatuto, onde o capitão José R. Fuare de Rosa os constitui em coluna com 66 moradores e 647 homens dos arraiais de Vemasse (450) Laleia e Cairui. Os moradores, de Baucau comandados pelo Liurai Freitas de Vemasse já tinham avançado para Bibuçuço nos meados de Janeiro.

No dia 15, chegava a 8ª Companhia Indígena de Moçambique (malae metan) que desembarcou do navio inglês Aldehanam. Era comandante desta Companhia Capitão Jaime Ramalho. O governador destinou 50 homens para Suro.

Com este reforço, a 22 de Fevereiro de 1912, as forças portuguesas eram assim constituídas:

1. Quartel General: 13 oficiais, 34 soldados, 375 moradores e 2.300 auxiliares;

2. Contingente da Zona leste, com a sede em Manatuto: 5 oficiais, 67 soldados, 2 voluntários, 41 moradores e 1.800 auxiliares.

3. Contingente da Fronteira: na zona de Batugadé e Balibó. Um oficial, 14 soldados e 11 moradores. Estas forças atacaram Atsabe desde o dia 18 de Fevereiro até 21 de Março.

4. Contingente de Oeste: incluía as zonas de Bobonaro e Hatolia. O contingente era formado por dois oficiais, 66 soldados, 368 moradores e 2.000 auxiliares. Nessa zona lutou-se ferozmente.

5. Dispositivo de Díli: a canhoeira Pátria, um oficial, 50 moçambicanos e um número indeterminado de moradores.

6. Dispositivo de Ermera: moradores locais e voluntários de Baucau e Manatuto.

No dia 22 de Fevereiro Filomeno da Câmara à frente de dispositivo de Quartel-general estabelece o acampamento em Maubisse. Projectava-se o avanço para sul, em direcção a Cablac e Same. Na zona oriental, com o avanço das forças governamentais algumas povoações que tinham aderido à revolta foram-se submetendo às autoridades: Turiscai, Bibuçuço, Alas, Dotic.

Porto, 5 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A GUERRA DE MANUFHAI (Continuação)

2012-01-04T18:01:00.000-08:00

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

Não foi um mero acaso que os homens de Dom Boaventura mataram o comandante de Same. A morte do Tenente Luís Silva teve precedentes de certa gravidade. Ele era um ríspido que chegou a esbofetear o irmão de Dom Boaventura, o dato Dom Vicente, irmão do régulo. Uma fonte holandesa diz que o oficial português tinha violado a liurai feto, mulher

Do liurai de Manufahi.

Depois dos incidentes ocorridos na tranqueira de Same no dia 24 e 25 de Dezembro de 1911, o governo português prevendo levantamento dos reinos entrou em preparativos para mais uma campanha contra Manufahi.

Naturalmente do lado dos combatentes de Manufahi já havia muito que os preparativos para a revolta estavam planeados: contacto com os liurais de Raimean, Bubuçuço, Bobonaro, Deribate, etc. Os homens estavam armados com algumas armas de fogo e sobretudo com as chamadas armas brancas: diman (azagaia), surik, catana, flechas, parões, facas, aidona (moca, cacete) etc. Tinham também construído fortificações de defesa nos contrafortes da montanha de Cablac e nas florestas das redondezas de Same. Os locais de guerra mais importantes dos rebeldes timorenses eram as colinas de Riac e de Leo Laco.

Segundo o governador Filomeno da Câmara essa colina estava coberta de densa floresta. Para ali tinham afluído famílias inteiras; e para ali tinham transportado comida, animais.

O professor Réné Pélisser fala dum número que ronda os cinco mil homens. Os portugueses calculam em 8.000 pessoas, entre as quais 3.000 combatentes.

O acampamento dos “revoltosos” de Manufahi estava cheio de trincheiras-abrigo. Os caminhos estavam barrados com sebes de bambu aguçado (luto).

O acontecimento de Same abalou profundamente a população de Praça de Dili. Em 1911, a capital da Colónia não tinha soldados da 1ª linha em número suficiente para defender a cidade. Nesse ano as forças em Timor eram constituídas por 75 soldados moçambicanos, alguns europeus (sargentos, cabos e soldados de artilharia, num total de 40 homens. Para a segurança da praça de Dili foram mobilizados nesse período moradores de Lacló, Manatuto, Piço. O número dos moradores andaria por uns 1.500 homens. O armamento era a espingarda de pederneira, e a Remington, alem da catana e de azagaias. Havia ainda um esquadrão de cavalaria do reino de Batugadé.

A morte do comandante de Same Luís Álvares foi dada a conhecer ao tenente António Joaquim de Almeida Valente, comandante do posto militar de Hatolia, pelo missionário de Suro. Na noite do dia 24 de 1911, o tenente leva ao conhecimento do Governador os acontecimentos de Same. No dia 28 de Dezembro de 1911, os homens de Manufahi e de Raimean atacavam o reino de Suro. Mas o ataque foi repelido pelos homens do liurai de Suro Nai-Cau.

No dia 29 de Dezembro o tenente Almeida Valente parte de Hatolia com 800 homens doas arrais de Mahubo e Deribate, chegando a Suro no dia 30. Os “manufaístas” retiram-se para as suas terras, mas deixam para trás os seus aliados de Bobonaro que devastam o suco de Mau-Ulo.

Conta Jaime Inso, comandante da Canhoeira Pátria, era grande a ansiedade em Díli. Perante as notícias de um assalto à praça de Díli, reuniu-se o conselho de oficiais que debateram duas possibilidades: ir em socorro da vila de Aileu ou defender Díli. O Governador Filomeno da Câmara resolveu ir em socorro de Aileu. Para isso organizou rapidamente uma coluna. A 12 de Janeiro de 1912, marchou para Aileu uma força composta por 200 homens, dos quais uns 25 eram brancos (malae), entre militares e reformados; os restantes eram moradores. Estes moradores eram das companhias de Bidau e Sica (na zona da actual Colmera), sob o comando de Liurai de Motael António Ataíde e do Alferes Garcia. Deram-se os recontros entre as forças governamentais e “rebeldes”. Os manufaístas conseguiram repelir por duas vezes. Mas depois de um terceiro recontro, os homens de Dom Boaventura retiram-se para o monte Cablac.

Entretanto o governador Filomeno da Câmara estabelece uma estratégia de guerra para dominar a região de Manufahi. As operações começariam em Janeiro de 1912 e durariam até o mês de Outubro.

Porto, 3 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A GUERRA DE MANUFAHI (1911-1912)

2012-01-04T17:48:00.000-08:00

Author Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

Neste mês de Dezembro de 2011, completam-se os cem anos do início do conflito de Manufahi. O começo da guerra de Manfahi teve a sua origem na morte do comandante de Same tenente Luiz Álvares da Silva e de europeus (três militares e um civil) dentro da tranqueira de Same e do comandante e Faturberliu.

Como é que tudo começou?

Em Dezembro de 1911, era comandante militar de Same o tenente Luiz Álvares da Silva; e era régulo (Liurai) de Manufai Dom Boaventura da Costa.

Conta-se que havia vários dias que Dom Boaventura não aparecia no Comando apesar de várias vezes ter sido convocado pelo tenente Silva. Dias antes, o comandante até mandara à casa do liurai (na localidade de Bandeira,) um soldado português, velho no Comando, amigo pessoal e compadre de Dom Boaventura. Esse soldado foi retido e depois assassinado.

Na manhã do dia 24 de Dezembro de 1911, véspera de Natal, o tenente Luís estava na sua residência e acabava de tomar banho. Apareceram no comando uns homens mandados por Dom Boaventura da Costa. Um ia amarrado e outros seguiam-no. Davam a entender que iam apresentar uma queixa ao comandante. O Tenente ao ver aquilo saiu para ouvir a queixa do que ia amarrado. Mas, de repente caíram golpes de catanadas sobre o comandante. Este tentou reagir correndo para dentro em busca da uma arma. Mas, tudo foi inútil. Os homens perseguem-no e cortam-lhe cabeça. A esposa do tente Silva estava dentro da casa com o filho ainda bebe. Os homens arrastam-na para fora e colocam no regaço a cabeça do marido. No interior da residência os timorenses reúnem os móveis sobre os quais colocam o cadáver do tenente Luís Silva. Entretanto mais três portugueses são mortos: dois soldados e um civil.

O irmão do régulo telefona ao Comandante de Fatuberliu Ferreira: “Diz o senhor comandante que, sendo amanhã Natal, o convida vir a Same, passar as festas como seu hóspede”. O comandante parte para Same no dia 25, mas foi morto perto da ribeira Sui.

Entretanto, Dom Boaventrua manda um guarda-fio acompanhar a mulher do malogrado tenente para Maubisse.

A notícia do assalto ao Comando de Same e a morte dos seis portugueses espalha-se pelas aldeias de Same. E de Maubisse, os ecos dos trágicos acontecimentos chegam a Dili.

Em resposta aos actos de rebelião, o governador Filomeno da Câmara mobilizou soldados, moradores e auxiliares que atacaram os redutos dos “revoltosos” desde Janeiro de 1912 até Outubro do mesmo ano. O resultado dessa campanha foi a prisão de Dom Boaventura e a sua consequente destituição no dia 26 de Outubro de 1912.

Os motivos remotos desta acção:

a) - Motivos nacionalistas: expulsar os portugueses de Timor. “Timor era para os Timorenses”. Rebeliões de 1895. Desde os tempos de Dom Duarte, pai de Dom Boaventura que os povos de Manufahi estavam rebelados contra os Portugueses. A forçada pacificação foi levada a cabo pelo governador José Celestino da Silva.

Desde tempos recuados que alguns reinos não aceitavam o domínio dos “malae muitin.” Basta recordar o pacto de 1719, cujo actor principal era o régulo de Camanasa, e a consequente guerra de Cailaco (1725-1726).

b) - Motivos políticos: A 5 de Outubro de 1910, deu-se a implantação do regime republicano em Lisboa. Os régulos timorenses que sempre juraram fidelidade ao rei de Portugal, não aceitaram a mudança do regime e a troca de bandeira. A bandeira real (azul e branca) pela nova bandeira (verde-rubra).Alguns liurais temiam que com o nome regime eles fossem destituídos e perdessem as regalias.

Diz-se que quando em Outubro 1910, os régulos foram a Díli para assistir à cerimónia da implantação da República, já havia um pacto para uma possível revolta. E que esses régulos eram incitados por timorenses assimilados ou civilizados, entre os quais se contava um mestiço chamado Domingos de Sena Barreto que era filho de um goês e de uma chinesa; e incitados por europeus ligados à loja maçónica de Díli e que estavam descontentes com o Governador.

Da parte das autoridades portugueses, forjou-se outro motivo: a implicação dos holandeses que eram monárquicos e que queriam também expulsar os portugueses de Timor, para poderem dominar toda a ilha.

c) - Motivos económicos:

As rebeliões que ocorreram em Timor, nos reinos das Províncias do Bellos e de Servião, tiveram a sua origem principal na cobrança de impostos.

Parecia que em 1911 o governo ia aumentar os impostos. A capitação deveria passar de uma pataca para duas patacas. O corte de uma árvore de sândalo seria taxado de duas patacas. Os coqueiros e os gados seriam recenseados. Seria estabelecido um imposto de 5 patacas aplicado sobre os animais abatidos por ocasião das cerimónias (enterros, construção de uma lulic e realização de estilos).

Foram estes os principais motivos de descontentamento por parte dos régulos que depois se uniram em guerra contra as autoridades.

Para o governo português e para muitos timorenses, o Natal de 1911 foi um Natal triste!

Porto, 22 de Dezembro de 2011.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

EUCAÇÃO PARA A PAZ

2012-01-04T08:57:00.000-08:00

author : Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A última Mensagem do Papa Bento XVI para o 45º Dia Mundial da Paz versa o tema da “Educar os Jovens para a Paz e a Justiça”.

Etimologia da “educação”

A palavra “educação” segundo alguns pedagogos, provém do verbo latino “educare”, que, no seu sentido mais primitivo, significa criar, alimentar. Outros fazem-na derivar do verbo “educere”, composto da preposição ex, que indica direcção para fora, e do verbo educere (conduzir), significando, por isso tirar de dentro para fora.

O Papa Bento XVI sublinha este segundo aspecto. Diz o Papa: “ A educação é aventura mais fundamental e difícil da vida. Educar – na sua etimologia latina educere – significa conduzir para fora de si mesmo ao centro d a realidade, rumo a uma plenitude que faz crescer a pessoa”.

No entanto estas duas raízes etimológicas completam-se para nos dizerem que a educação supõe dois movimentos: um de dentro para fora: o desenvolvimento; outro, de fora para dentro: a ajuda, o alimento, o apoio, a orientação dos outros. Partindo deste princípio pode-se “definir a educação como desenvolvimento integral, harmonioso e progressivo da pessoa humana à sua plena maturidade” (Américo Veiga, A Educação Hoje”, 2005, p. 13).

A palavra “educação” designa o processo global da sociedade pelo qual as pessoas e os grupos sociais aprendem a assegurar conscientemente no interior da comunidade nacional e internacional e em benefício desta, o desenvolvimento integral da sua personalidade, das suas capacidades, das suas atitudes, das suas aptidões e dos eu saber.

A educação para a paz é um processo para incutir nas pessoas uma nova maneira de ver, de entender e de viver o mundo. A verdadeira educação para paz é aquela que leva as pessoas a acreditarem nos valores positivos: a importância da vida humana; a fraternidade humana, a cooperação internacional, o respeito e a tolerância, o diálogo, etc.

Como vivemos numa “aldeia global” a educação para a paz deve caracterizar-se pela compreensão e respeito de todos os povos, das suas civilizações, dos seus valores e dos seus modos de vida, incluindo as culturas da etnias nacionais e de grupos minoritários; a educação para a paz deve apontar para capacidade de comunicar com os outros, a consciência não só dos próprios direitos, mas também dos deveres que os indivíduos, grupos e nações têm para com os outros; a educação para paz deve criar nos indivíduos a vontade e capacidade de resolver os problemas das suas comunidade, dos seus países de do mundo.

Os programas ou as áreas para uma verdadeira educação à paz: a) a aprendizagem de uma cidadania democrática; os direitos humanos, a democracia e a tolerância; paz e segurança regionais e internacionais; o desenvolvimento económico, e social sustentável; livre circulação de informação e conhecimentos, os valores éticos; a prática de virtudes como: a justiça, solidariedade, generosidade, perdão, etc.

Todas as componentes da sociedade devem envolver-se no processo da educação para a paz:

1 - Os próprios indivíduos: a vontade firme em educar-se e formar-se para uma cultura de paz interior e de paz social. A paz interior é a tranquilidade de espírito proveniente da capacidade de domínio das paixões (ódio, vingança, ira, etc.), e da consciência de estar em comunhão de amizade com Deus e com o próximo. A paz social ou a paz exterior é a tranquila convivência com as pessoas e com as coisas criadas.

2 - A Família: Neste contexto, os pais são os primeiros educadores dos filhos. A família é a primeira escola de valores e de virtudes.

3 - As instituições educativas (o jardim infantil, a escola, a universidade): são espaços para a formação de personalidade dos alunos no serviço à comunidade, no respeito pela diferença e no espírito de colaboração.

4 - As religiões: as religiões contribuem para a educação da paz quando incutem nos seus seguidores o sentido do Absoluto, a capacidade de admiração e de espanto perante o belo, o bem e o justo; quando ensina as virtudes de respeito, tolerância, perdão e amor. As religiões devem ser factores de paz, de tolerância, de colaboração e de respeito.

5 - Os Estados: os estados têm o papel fundamental na educação dos seus cidadãos: através de políticas que desenvolvam nos educadores uma ética de valores morais culturais e religiosos; através de programas de conhecimentos interdisciplinares sobre os problemas mundiais da guerra, da fome, da destruição do meio ambiente, da corrupção, da corrida ao armamento e do fabrico de armas de destruição maciça. O Estado poderá ser um promotor de paz quando os governantes evitam a corrupção, as injustiças, a exploração, evitando a descriminação e criando uma sociedade justa, fraterna e solidária.

(continua no próximo número)

Porto, 2 de Janeiro de 2012.

Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo

A New Year Begins – but what else will be new?

2012-01-02T00:21:00.000-08:00

BY AGIO PEREIRA

As we end 2011 and begin another new year, the international security arena is filled with dangerous news. The European Union continues to give little indication of being capable of taking the definitive action needed to save the Eurozone’s currency and its economy from deepening financial crisis. While the financial mess in the periphery of Greece and Portugal heralds the possible break-up of the Union, the weakness of Italy and Spain is of even greater concern. If France was to falter, then the game is all but up. This coupled with the anemic US economy and the threat of a Chinese slow down, raises the specter of a global recession.

Potential candidates to leave the EZ, the world’s current conflicts still rage and threaten global security. The “Strait of Hormuz standoff continues as Iran films US aircraft carrier”[1] does not add to any sense of optimism. The US too, perhaps moved by its own financial crisis and desperate need to create jobs, decided to move on with $11 billion worth of arms and training for the Iraqi military. This is in spite of the apparent move by Prime Minister al-Maliki to build a one-party system with possible moves to establish closer links with Iran.[2] In the Korean Peninsula the hard line communist North Korea declares Kim Jong-un its new supreme leader in the presence of what the New York Times writer Choe Sang-Hun says was a crowd of tens of thousands, most of them uniformed soldiers, packed the plaza – named after…the North’s founding president, Kim Il-sung.[3]

The ‘old’ year of 2011 ended with three months of severe floods in Lao PDR, Vietnam Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines with two South East Asian countries worst affected. European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection agency estimates point to 4.5 million people affected in the Philippines and 5.1 million people affected in Thailand.[4] With the lives and property lost; the psychological impact of forced displacement and the wholesale destruction of livelihoods, the overall human cost cannot be estimated in words. The European Commission has already provided about 10 million Euros to help overcome the consequences of this flood. Indonesia has also been affected by severe floods causing thousands of displaced people.

What else needs to be overcome in 2012? It is sometimes said that predictions are very difficult to make, especially about the future. But what we can clearly say is needed is a more determined international community to respond to the challenges of climate change which, directly or indirectly, negatively impacts on these cyclical humanitarian disasters. Taking action is a moral as well as a political responsibility because, as the South East Asian floods testify, the poor and the disenfranchised part of the population are, more often than not, the main victims of natural disasters as they live in the least protected, more dangerous and vulnerable areas.

The ‘old’ year of 2011 certainly marked a turning point in many important ways. First, the US finally withdrew its military from Iraq. This means Iraq can now enjoy sovereignty and make use of it as its government pleases. One troubling possible direction, however, seems to be towards more difficult ethnic-religious relations and potentially higher risk of civil war. The autonomous regions of Iraq may also feel inclined to distance from the Shi’ite dominated central government, thus making the cohesion of the state of Iraq and its sovereignty much weaker. Second, in Afghanistan, President Obama’s promise of a gradual or phased withdrawal from July 2011 may have begun, but the solution for the conflict remains a farfetched reality.

The love-and-hate U.S. – Pakistan bilateral relationship has no clear end in sight. Pakistan’s threats to keep the state of affairs in its current dire state have eventuated and there appears to be nothing the US can do to improve relations. It seems that the Pakistani refusal to let go its leverage over the Taliban means that any real solution, if at all possible, will have to be one that safeguards the influence of Pakistan over the Taliban and Afghanistan as a whole. The dilemma for Pakistan is that the longer it maintains cooperation with the US, in the context of the war on terror, the weaker its chances to influence the Taliban become. Worse, the Taliban may even develop some capacity to destabilise the Pakistani government as the latest events appear to suggest. Third, debate about whether counterinsurgency (COIN) does work has reached a dead-end. Those against argue that the counterinsurgency military culture has to free itself from the conventional military paradigm and become informed by the existing reality of world politics. In this reality the world is no longer under the empire colonial conjuncture leading to a need to focus on nationbuilding, statebuilding and real human development as the best strategic approach to solving post-modern conflicts. Nevertheless, the main theoretical hurdle remains the foreign occupation dilemma. No matter how well meaning the foreign forces pretend to be, they cannot wipeout the fact that they are occupying forces. The question therefore becomes whether the pre-emptive doctrine has any military validity.

The new year of 2012 will also see the continuity of the Chindian syndrome. The challenges China and India face in terms of economic sustainability are enormous. And whether democracy or autocracy is best suited to provide sustained development will continue to be the question. Time magazine provided, in its 21November 2011 issue, an in-depth debate about the pros and cons of the Chindian syndrome. What the debate does not provide is an analysis of external factors affecting the capabilities of these two giant states in terms of meeting their respective demands for survival as giant economies.

The dependency on natural resources and energy supply, for instance, is a daunting challenge and the answer does not depend on either democratic or socialist approaches. Rather it turns on resource availability and competition with other states, particularly the US, as the cold war between China and the US in Africa testifies - where they desperately fight for control of supply from resource-rich countries like Nigeria and Angola. This reality is independent of political regimes or doctrines with the sustainability of economic development being determined by a dependable supply of energy sources.

Therefore, in-depth debate about the sustainability of this flow of energy is first needed, before consideration of factors such as democracy or communism emerge as important determinants. When powerful countries become desperate for energy supply, they can declare such imperatives to be the national interest and justify the invasion of countries which hold such commodities. The US has practiced this in the past. During the war in Vietnam, Saudi Arabia decided to stop supply of petroleum to the US which prompted President Nixon to dispatch his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to convey to the Saudi Arabian King that, in its national interest, the US would invade his country if it did not provide the US with petroleum.

Judging from the debates in 2011 about the future of the Kyoto Protocol, in which China underestimated the entire process of climate change in Copenhagen; instead of focusing on how best to ‘loot’ the energy supplies from Africa. And the US continued to arrogantly disregard the real issues pertaining to climate change (even though Al Gore won world recognition for his appeal to accept reality), 2012 provides the opportunity for norm clarification. How far the US and China are prepared to boycott the process of finding real solutions for climate change constitutes important debate. President Obama decided to pioneer the end of nuclear weapons, instead of the end of climate change hypocrisy. Perhaps a wise policy to opt for what is possible instead of what is impossible, as the case of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs testify. The New Year, 2012, may bring about better opportunities to devise responsible policies to tackle climate change. First, there is the question of how to adopt policies which allow for cheaper, more affordable alternative sources of energy for the developing countries. Second, is the question of how to increase access by the younger generation to knowledge about alternative energy; and how to save energy before alternative sources of energy become available? Achieving solutions to these two questions may, eventually, bring about a better framework to address climate change.

May 2012 bring about new attitudes, ones more conducive towards real solutions to climate change, conflict resolution and nation and state building processes. Not necessarily final solutions but at least departing points to encourage serious thought about real solutions, rather than curtain dressing politics which insult the real needs of the poorest of the poor who are the victims of climate change. May 2012 also bring about smarter international politics, approaches which promote the empowerment of countries and peoples with the tools and know-how to ensure their countries’ survival. May 2012 also be the year where fighting poverty is no longer part of grandiose political and academic statements but that real practical steps can be taken which will mean creating sustained employment in poor countries; may 2012 be the beginning of a new form of cooperation between countries, rich and poor, powerful and powerless, where the ultimate goal is human development because this is, after all is said and done, the only answer to global security.

Happy 2012!

[1] R Sanchez, “Strait of Hormuz standoff continues as Iran films US aircraft carrier”, The Telegraph, 29 December 2011, accessed 30/12/2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/new/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8983631/Strait-of-Hormuz-standoff-continues-a...

[2] M Schmidt and E Schmitt, “Weapons Sales to Iraq Move Ahead Despite U.S. Worries”, The New York Times, accessed 30/12/2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/middleeast/us-military-sales-to-iraq-raise-concerns.html?_r=1&nl...

[3] C Sang-Hun, “At Huge Rally, North Koreans Declare Kim Their Leader”, The New York Times, December 29, 2011, accessed 30/12/2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/asia/north-korea-declares-kim-jong-un-as-supreme-leader-html

[4] ‘South East Asia under Water’, European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Brussels, European Union, November 2011

Kolektivismu: Karakterístika Konfrontos Violentos iha Timor-Leste?

2011-12-31T01:18:00.000-08:00

Dionísio Babo-Soares*

Iha inisiu fulan Dezembro 2011, mossu fila-fali konfrontasaun violenta involve membrus balun hosi arte marciais (laos instituisaun), nebé resulta ema balun lakon vida, balun kanek todan iha área Betó ho área seluk iha Komoro, Dili. Konfrontasaun nuné mossu dala-uluk ona iha fatin barak hanesan iha Baucau, Same no Suai nebé estraga uma ho propriedade barak, ema lakon vida ho hamossu deslokadus barak.

Akontesimentu nebé mossu iha fulan Dezembro 2011 iha Dili, akontesse iha tempo nebé tuir-lolos ema hotu túr hakmatek hodi komemora Natal, celebra ita Nai Jesus Cristo nia moris, ho hein tinan foun 2012 nebé Timor oan tomak sei halao festa democrasia ka eleisaun geral. Mesmo konfontasaun né involve deit individuais ka jovem nebé konsiderado nakar, no sira nebé tur iha dalan ninin, hemu tua tó lanu no deskontroladu, maibe sira nia afilisasaun ho grupos arte marciais nebé durante né involve iha konflitus violentos, assosía kedas involvimento instituisaun nian iha assoens hirak né.

Hatan ba akontesimento né, iha 22 Dezembro 2011, Konselho Ministro foti decizaun suspende aktividades arte marciais hotu iha Timor-Leste hosi tinan ida (1) to tinan tolu (3), no suspende jogos lotária nebé eziste, ho durasaun to fulan nen (6) nia laran.

Konfrontos violentos iha Dezembro 2012 né akotesse ho karakterístika hanesan sira-uluk, grupos kontra grupos (kolektivo) no autor mesak hanesan deit, elementos hosi grupos arte marciais. Hafoin tuir kedas ho assoens violentas nebé individuais sira maka halo hodi selu-hikas (revenge) derrota anterior. Maske iha nível lideransa grupo sira né rasik halo bebeik kompromissu, verbal no por escrita, katak sira hakribi violensia no promete sei la halo assoes violentas, akontesimentus sira né hatudu deit katak kompromisso sira né folin laiha. At liu tan, hatudu deit deskonfiansa katak ita labele sadere ba promessas, mesmo ke né halo rasik hosi lideransa boot grupos arte marciais nian. Né mos hatudo falta autoridade atu kontrola membrus sira iha karaik, liu-liu tanba, dala barak, ema nebé la sala, mak simu todan ka konsekuensia hosi konfrontos violentos hirak né.

Modelu konfrontos violentos entre grupos (grupos kontra grupo) hodi halibur malu, mobiliza massa grupo halo violensia laos fenómena foun iha ita nia rain. Tradisionalmente, mobilizasaun klan (grupo étnico) ka etno-linguístico hodi baku-malu ka halo-funu nebé uza meios violentos konhesidu ona iha ita nia história.

Iha eleisoens hirak liu ba, iha distrito balun, membro partidos balun ataka ema nebé konsiderado mai hosi partido seluk. Eventualmente, halo ema nebé kbiit laek mak térus.

Tanba sa mak konfrontos violentos nuné mossu bebeik iha Timor? Tanba sa mak sempre involve membrus arte marciais, no tanba sa sira sempre eskapa? Infelizmente, to agora laiha rezolusaun nebé sistemátiku no laiha investigasaun profunda iha parte criminal hosi hosi entidades seguransa, no laiha estudos ho peskizas científikas hodi bele ajuda rezolve.

Karakterístika Violensia Kolektiva

Geralmente, konflito ka violensia refere ba diferensa ka xokes de interesse entre ema/grupos bainhira sira kompete atu hadau rekursus nebé limitadu iha vida social. Nuné, mobilizasaun ema-barak ka grupos, ka uza instituisaun nebé sira reprezenta nia naran hodi hetan lijitimidade, mossu nudar karakterístika assaun violenta nuné. Normalmente, mobilizasaun hodi kompete ba “rekursus limitadus” hanesan kompete ba pozisaun polítika, kompete atu habelar área kontrolo, hadau poder, riku-soin ho rekursus seluk mak sai nudar objektivu eventual konfrontos hirak né. Maibe iha Timor-Leste karakterístika konflitus violentos entre grupos, mossu liu-liu tanba kompetisaun entre grupos arte marciais (perguruan), mós tanba ódio ho vingansa nebé originalmente, no dala barak, inicia hosi diferensas ka konfrontos individuais.

Iha teoria konabá konflito social demonstra, violensia entre grupos mossu tanba karakter “kolektivu”. Ema ka grupo uza naran instituisaun ka grupo nudar identidade hodi bele define a’an no mos identifika sé mak inimigo, ka identifika sé maka lideransa iha grupo ida nia laran (in-group).

Mesmo ke seidauk iha estudos profundus, iha Timor ita bele konfirma katak konflitus arte marciais akontese frekuentemete ho modelu ka modus operandi hanesan: normalmente evolui hosi diferensas individuais no ikus mai buka lejitíma a’an iha grupo ka instituisaun arte-marsiais. Modus operandi né rasik maka konfrontos violentos, uza kroat, assaltu ho grupos, oho-malu no estraga propriedes ema nian. Bainhira lijitíma a’an nudar grupos, sira fasilmente distingi inimigo no identifika sé maka maluk-rasik (in gropu). Eventualmente, konfrontos violentos entre inimigos sira né involve ona ema barak ka grupos kontra grupos (antar perguruan).

Konfrontos violentos entre grupos arte-marsiais, to agora, laos tanba deit hadau-malu poder hanesan iha eleisoens gerais, maibe tanba deit odio ho vingansa ka mossu tanba polarizasaun interesse grupos nian, nebé movimenta grupos idak-idak hodi baku malu ho karakter kolektivu. Konflitus violentos kunhesidu nudar realidade natural iha vida social humana. Maibe oinsá atu resolve ka halakon violensia sira né, depende ba modelu kolektivu iha fatin nebé konflito sira n’e rasik mossu.

Ema matenek sira dehan iha sikun-rua (two aspects) nebé lahanesan iha modelu kolektivismo, kolektivisme inklusivu ho eksklusivo.

Iha kolektivismu inklusivu, individu sira nebé pretense ba grupo ida, bele komunika malu abertamente liu hosi diálogo ho negosiasaun ka liu hosi mekanismu judicial legal. Maibe identidade koletivismu inklusivu né mamar (ladun forte) hela tanba ema barak tebes nebé pretense ba kolektivismu inklusivu (grupo), no dala-ruma la kunhese malu. Tanba deit sira halibur hamutuk ho interesse/ objektivu hanesan, sira hare ema seluk nudar inimigo. Ezemplu membrus partido A barak mak la kunhese malu, maibe tanba deit sira partidu ida, sira halibur malu hamutuk. Nuné relasaun entre lideransa ho membrus sira imperativu maie dikursivu liu, ka hosi leten ba karaik deit.

Nuné, prosesu atu identifika sé mak inimigo liu hosi analiza kolektivu inklusivu né tenki halo ho kuidadu tebes, tanba membrus sira la kunhese malu hotu. Kolektivismu inklusivu normalmente eziste iha sosiedade urbana ho klasse media (white collar) nebé estabelecido ka diak ona ekonómikamente no ema nebé iha edukasaun nível a’as.

Iha kolektivismu eksklusivo, ema ladun komunika abertamente ka laiha diálogo ou negosiasaun entre sira ho grupo seluk. Sira hateke liu ba sira nia a’an ka grupo nia laran (auto-introspection) no revindika (claim) katak sira mak monopolía lia-los (monopoly of the truth), no haré grupo ka ema seluk hanesan salah hela deit, fraku no ladiak. Ema sira né sempre iha persepssau katak grupo ka ema seluk ladiak, la halo buat ida, no só sira mak bele, só sira mak defende lia-lós, só sira mak halo buat hotu.

Relasaun iha kolektivismo ekslusivo (grupo nia laran) – entre lideransa ho nia membrus sira – akontesse ho karakter represivu ka obrigatório hosi leten ba karaik (top down approach). Tanba né, naran lideransa hatudo deit katak ema ka grupo seluk nudar inimigo, restante seluk halo tuir deit. Bainhira lideransa temi grupo B ka C nudar inimigo, membro hotu-hotu sei halo mobilisasaun kolektiva, moralmente ho fisíkamente, hodi ataka inimigo né.

Tuir matenek-nain ida naran Korotelina iha Identity Conflicts (2009), tendensia kolektivismu eksklusivu hili liu konfrontasaun violenta (agresão física) no rejeita atu halo komunikasaun abertamente ho grupo nebé konsiderado inimigo. Kolektivismu eksklusivu normalmente eziste iha sosiedade nebé ekonomikamente sei fraku, ema kiak barak, no ema ladun iha asessu ba sistema edukasaun moderna.

Tanba né, tuir lolos konfrontos violentos entre grupos arte marsiais iha Timor tenki hetan ona atensaun makas, hosi autoridades seguransa nian, lideransa grupos arte marciais nian, sociedade sivil no entidades sociais no polítikas hotu-hotu. Iha Timor, tendensia atu liga grupos arte marciais ka partidos politicos ho identidade kolektivismu exklusivu boot tebes, tanba né mak sepre hamosu violensia entre grupos (collective).

Né laos buat foun ida tanba iha grupos etno-linguístiku barak iha Timor-Leste maka sei iha tendensia atu taka-an (menutupi diri). Nia membros sira, maski moris iha komunidade pluralístiku hanesan iha Dili, bainhira komunika ho grupo etnía seluk, uza deit sira nia língua etnía no la interesse ema seluk. Tendensia social ida né maka halo tiha segregasaun natural iha sociedade ida nia laran no kria divisionismu (gap/separasaun), no sempre hamosu konflitus violentus. Kolektivismu ekslusivo akontesse iha grupos sira né nia laran, no kria konflitus inklui iha konflitus arte marsiais.

Preciza Assaun Afirmativa

Infelizmente, durante né maski mossu konfrontasaun entre grupos arte marciais ho karakter kolektivismu ekslusivu, laiha mekanismu ida atu resolve to nia abut. Iha Policia ho nia atuasaun nebé diak, hodi hapara no hamate assoes violentas sira né maibe parece ladauk ke to nia abut. Mossu espekulasaun oin-oin hosi sosiedade sivil, Nasoens Unidas, no analista social sira, maibe fakta hatudo katak kolektivismu eksklusivu tuir lolos tenki iha aproximasaun nebé intensivu ho bebeik.

Iha semana rua kotuk, Konselho Ministru hasai ona decizaun atu hapara aktividade arte marciais ho aktividade bola guling tanba hamossu bebeik konflitus nebé alastra hosi individual ba konflitus violentos entre grupos. Será ke né efektívu? Iha kurto-prazu ita bele dehan sim. Maibe oinsa ba oin? Hapara deit to ona?

Tuir lolos iha nível seguransa bele prevene konflitu sira nuné. Idealmente, instituisoens seguransa nian tenki iha no implementa konseito nebé integradu hodi bele transforma konfrontos violentos iha sosiedade atu sai fali koligasaun dame, hakmatek no domin. Iha plataforma seluk nebé ita bele uza maka diálgu, resolusaun liu hosi mekanismu legal, no laos violensia.

Karik kolektivismu eksklusivu sei sai nudar faktu ida iha ita nia rain, instituisoens seguransa estadu nian preciza halo programa específiko, para além de hametin seguransa hosi parte polisial, hodi bele muda karakter kolektivismu eksklusivo transforma fali nudar kolektivismu inklusivo. Nuné bele ajuda resolve violensia entre grupos ho karaktes sira iha leten.

Ita rekunhese katak dalan diálogu mos halao bebeik ona mais la konsegue resolve. Karik nuné dalam legal ka aplikasaun lei ho firmeza sai nudar alternativu diak ba resolusaun problemas mais tenki mos hare progama seluk hanesan kompetisaun arte marciais nebé activu liu, regulariza aktividades sira né hotu, kampanha non-violensia nebé focus no halo mekanismu restrisaun nebé bele kontrola aktividade arte marciais ho dignidade.

Nudar iha rai seluk nebé iha problema hanesan ita, programa sira né inklui programa sosializasaun ba mekanismo judicial, treinamento lideransa no mekanismu resolusaun konflitu tuir dalan dame nian. Nuné mos oinsa kria programa seluk atu bele transforma kolektivismu eksklusivo, inkluindo kria programa atu hadia porgrama juventude nian.

Problema dezemprego, kiak, ho edukasaun baixa sai nudar konsidaun fundamental nebé halo ita nia sosiedade difisil atu sai hosi karakter kolektivismu eksklusivo. Né tanba ema kiak sira sente katak so liu hosi kolektivismu eksklusivo deit sira bele espressa sira nia frustrasaun. Tanba né dezenvolvimento iha seitor ekonomia nebé bele aumenta bem-estar tem ke lao makaas, selae kolektivismo exklusivo sei forte nafatin iha sistema social sociedade nian.

Konflitu arte marciais iha Timor-Leste hamossu vítima barak ona, no vítima sira né mossu tanba aksaun kolektivismu eksklusivo nian. Tanba né ita tenki buka transforma modelu kolektivismu eksklusivo né ba kolektivismu inklusivo liu hosi aktus antisipasaun no prevensaun, hodi transforma kolektivismu eksklusivo iha sosiedade nia laran, atu nuné konflitus violentos iha ita nia rain, bele resolve ho dame, no ho dignidade.

*Autor, Sekretario Geral CNRT, no membro corpo dosente iha Universidade Nacional (UNTL) ho UNPAZ. Artigo né opinião pessoal no la representa institusaun nebé autor representa.

AS ELEIÇÕES DE 2012 EM TIMOR-LESTE E A NECESSIDADE DA PRESERVAÇÃO DA PAZ

2011-12-31T01:04:00.000-08:00

No ano de 2012 realizar-se-ão em Timor-Leste as eleições presidenciais e legislativas. Para que essas eleições sejam justas, é indispensável que elas decorrem num clima de paz e de tranquilidade. Para que haja paz e tranquilidade nas aldeias, vilas e em todo o país, é necessário que os Timorenses se eduquem para a paz, para a democracia, para o diálogo e vivam numa cultura de paz.

Mas o que é a paz? Em Tétum a paz diz-se “dame”, em Bahasa Indonésia “kedamaian”, em Português paz. A palavra portuguesa “paz”, a espanhola “paz”, a italiana “pace”, a francesa “paix” e a inglesa “peace”, provém da palavra latina “Pax, pacis”. O termo pax, pacis com o dativo pacem, corresponde ao termo hebraico shalom, palavra que deriva da raiz “shelemut” e, significa perfeição, plenitude.

No Império Romano o conceito de Pax indicava o período em que a nível interno, não havia lutas, nem conflitos nem guerras civis. Pelo contrário predominava uma ordem geral de ordem, de tranquilidade. Essa ordem geral chamava-se “Pax Romana”. Ligado ao conceito da paz, os romanos cultivavam outros conceitos abstractos, como concordia (concórdia), honor (honra), fides (fé), virtus (virtude), victoria (vitória).

No contexto judaico-cristão, ao termo Shalom existem termos associados como harmonia, tranquilidade, felicidade, prosperidade, bem-estar, graça. Shalom significa ainda bênção, manifestação da graça divina, justiça, verdade. No livro do profeta Isaías a “paz é fruto da justiça” (Is. 32,17). Segundo o mesmo Profeta “Deus é Príncipe da Paz messiánica (Is. 9, 5).

Nos Evangelhos, a palavra paz ocorre em várias passagens. Na noite em que nascia o menino Jesus, os Anjos cantavam: “Gloria a Deus nas alturas e paz aos homens de boa vontade”(Lc 2,14s); Depois da sua Ressurreição, Nosso senhor Jesus Cristo dirige palavras de paz aos seus discípulos: “ A paz seja convosco” (Jo. 21, 19 e 21); “Deixo-vos a paz, dou-vos a minha paz” (14,27). São Paulo afirma que a verdadeira paz é o pessoa de Jesus Cristo: “Ele é a nossa Paz” (Ef.2, 14).

Os Padres da Igreja nas suas catequeses insistiam muito a paz, a ordem, a tranquilidade, a justiça e o amor ao próximo. Santo Agostinho, bispo de Hipona (séc. IV), no norte da África, dizia que a paz é a “tranquilidade na ordem.”

No século XX, depois das duas Grandes Guerras Mundiais (1914-1918) e (1939-1945) As Nações Unidas publicaram a Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos (1948). Logo no Preâmbulo se pode ler: “Considerando que o reconhecimento d dignidade inerente a todos os membros da família humana e dos seus direitos iguais e inalienáveis constitui o fundamento da liberdade, da justiça e da paz no mundo.”

Ainda no século passado a Igreja Católica quer através dos Documentos do Concílio Vaticano II quer através do magistério dos Papas (João XXIII, Paulo VI e João Paulo II) tem repetido em várias ocasiões que questão da Paz é fundamental para a vida dos homens e do planeta.

O Concílio Vaticano II afiram que a paz não é só a ausência da guerra e nem se reduz ao estabelecimento de equilíbrio entre forças adversas (cfr. GS, n. 78). Para se edificar a paz é necessária a vontade firme de respeitar a dignidade dos outros homens, outros povos e, portanto, é necessária a prática da fraternidade.

Segundo o Papa Paulo VI (1963-1978) o novo nome da paz é desenvolvimento. Porém, não se trata apenas de um desenvolvimento económico, mas um desenvolvimento autêntico que visa promover todos os homens e o homem todo. Nesta perspectiva, a paz significa a erradicação de injustiças e desigualdades de ordem económica ou social; erradicação de invejas, de desconfiança e do orgulho que grassam entre os homens e as nações e que são uma constante ameaça a paz (cf. a Carta Encíclica Populorum Progressio, n. 5, n. 13, etc.).

O antecessor de Paulo VI, o Papa João XXIII (1958-1963), escreveu a Encíclica Pacem in Terris. Na perspectiva do Papa, “as mútuas relações internacionais devem regular-se não pelo recurso à força das armas, mas pela norma da recta razão, isto é, na base da verdade, da justiça e de uma activa solidariedade.”(cfr. P. in T., nn. 34-38).

(continia no próximo número).

Porto, 30 de Dezembro de 2011.

Dom Carlos Filipe ximenes Belo

Community Based Policing: The factors that influence Police Forces to engage more closely with a local community

2011-12-30T03:24:00.001-08:00

Written by Agio Pereira

Díli, December 2011

Abstract

Community based policing has become an important policing option for many developed and developing countries; countries where institutional frailty, particularly in the area of law enforcement sector, consider community policing as an important component of overall policing strategies. Why is community policing is important and how best to approach this policing strategy is still an ongoing debate in the realms of policy-makers as well as academic community and the police force itself. One reason is because crime prevention and crime eradication is a constant part of society and the root-cause of crime is researched but consensus is not an easy place to land. Since Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations, Cesare Beccaria’s ‘Crime and Punishment’ and Colquhoun’s ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, considered to be the first book ever comprehensively written on policing, still there is no answer to how communities should deal with crime. One reason is because the problem is not crime itself, but the way communities generate fear and respond to the perceived factors of fear under different circumstances of community’s existence, including the space, the politics, the level of social integration and inter-community relations within a state. In the meantime, ‘beat policing’ is increasingly adopted as the best approach to generate community confidence in the police force because it increases the perception that police officers are present within the community or, at least, readily accessible in case they are needed. Crime cannot be exterminated by the police, but together with the community, the element of fear can be mitigated so that healthy living can be the focus of living as a community. Increasing the cost of crime further contributed towards this end.

Introduction

Time magazine’s essay ‘Peace Through Security’, by Tim Padgett, rightly argues that Central America’s crisis calls for better policing, not more military.[1] This call reflects concern for legitimacy as well as a reflection on whether the military can ever respond to situations of civil unrest and systemic criminality. Around the world, situation of crises, high criminal rate and systemic disorder, focusing on effective policing in the community has become the answer because the aim is to enhance police legitimacy and the trust of citizens on the institutions of law enforcement and, ultimately, on the state itself. But what is community policing? In short, community policing is a natural phenomenon derived from the survival instinct of the individuals as well as a collective need for survival. Police forces evolved from this basic instinct. Society, community, family and individual citizens are interdependent;[2] and since the division of labor[3] evolved within society, partly imposed by the concept of property,[4] the need for protection became increasingly institutionalized. It is about curbing greed in the society[5] so that predictability can be enhanced and harmonious society becomes viable and strengthened. Man also became ‘conjoined’[6] with citizen and the duties to the state. Community policing is also needed because ‘even if man were born in a condition to desire to enter society, it does not follow that he was born suitably equipped to enter society…distrust, suspicion, precaution and provision against fear are all characteristic of men who are afraid’.[7] The state and the citizen share mutual fear; helping each other to overcome it brings about the state’s prerogative of mutual benefits. Successful community policing can enhance restraints, which in the English of the seventeenth century, Colquhoun posits ‘as the means of preventing Crimes, are fuch (sic) as muft (sic) produce this falutary (sic) effect, without hindering the privileges of innocence; fince (sic) they apply to thofe (sic) claffes (sic) only, the nature of whole dealings, from being in many inftances (sic) both unlawful and immoral, immediately affect …the Country at large.’[8] Therefore, community policing is about overcoming fear in the community as well as the concern of the police forces about their inability to impose sufficient restraints on the citizens so that society can be free from fear. This essay highlights beat policing as an example of community based policing and then attempts to explain the factors influencing a Police Force to engage more closely with local communities.[9]

Police, crime and the local community: a symbiotic relationship

On Beat Policing and the Community

A report by the Queensland (Australia) Crime and Misconduct Commission evaluating beat policing in Queensland, asserts that ‘beat policing is expected to have an impact on crime, in part because officers embark on proactive, preventive strategies, and in part because officers provide a visible police presence in the community or shopping centre.’[10] The key findings pertaining to neighbourhood beats include reduction in overall crime rate as well as property crime rates and increase in the rate of reported crime.[11] However, on the perceptions of crime and personal safety, although ‘beat policing aims to build community partnerships and improve the relationship between police and the public’,[12] the report established that, generally, ‘beats do not necessarily make residents feel safer; nor do shopfronts necessarily make shoppers and retailers feel more safe’.[13] Hence, the report recommends that beat officers should be allowed to respond to more matters in their area and manage their workload more effectively,[14] remain focus and continually meet the needs of beat-area residents.[15] Nevertheless, neighborhood beats led to residents in higher perceived levels of crime and disorder to believe that these problems were improving,[16] allowing for the conclusion that ‘beat officers are responsive and effective in addressing crime and disorder in their neighborhoods’.[17] The need to regular evaluation and review of success and failure, as well as effectiveness[18] and relevance[19] were particularly identified as important for successful police beats. One factor favoring beat policing is the rationale related to the ‘utilitarian theory’.[20] It ‘assumes that criminals are rational and balance the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action’,[21] and that ‘when criminals are given the choice of illegal versus legal avenues of economic gain, they more often choose the latter when the costs of crime increase.’[22] It follows that the presence of beat policing can increase the costs of crime, making criminal acts less attractive.

But what is a local community? - Nowadays, there are virtual communities such as the Facebook community, the twitters community and the Wikileak community. There are the real communities like the Retired Service League (RSL) or the war veterans’ community, the elderly community,[23] the gangs’[24] community and the more geographically emphasised ‘local community’.[25] What is important from community policing point of view is that there are ‘common ties and social interaction’[26] within a local residential area. Citing Lowry Nelson, Hillery points out that “in general, the term community[27] refers to a group of people inhabiting a limited area, who have a sense of belonging together and who through their organized relationships share and carry on activities in pursuit of their common interests.’[28] One challenge for community policing is how to profile the problems facing a particular local community. In the case of Australia, commonness and common interests may be clear in terms of duties towards the state, paying taxes and expecting the Government to deliver social programs reflecting value for money. At a micro level, however, kinship and common historical and ethnic background tend to play more important role in social cohesion. Blocks of buildings, houses and apartments may not necessarily provide opportunities to develop an effective beat policing strategy; residents may ‘supplemented police with the doorman’[29] and ‘protect themselves as individuals and not as a community’,[30] making ‘the battle against crime effectively lost’.[31] Hence, making police presence almost permanent in a local area, through beat policing, may reduce fear. What is uncertain is whether necessarily increases safety in the house where domestic violence,[32] may occur.

Community policing: strategic partnership and empowerment

The inability of the Police Force to impose sufficient restraints against misconducts[33] and crime led to the decision to bring members of the community to bear some degree of responsibility to overcome factors affecting fear, including unexpected acts of misconducts. Alcoholism, high-activity drugs areas or hot spots,[34] youth drug addiction,[35] theft, gangs ‘regular rendezvous’[36] and short run hedonism[37] and gangs’ graffiti,[38] are part of the factors inflicting fear in the community, namely because ‘predictions of intent and character’[39] can be totally unreliable. Individuals and families need an environment free from fear in order to focus on their development; children need not fear their own surrounding so they can focus on learning and growing with faith in making the most of what society has to offer. Hence, the local communities, including the children and youth in general are the most interested parties because solving the problems that impede them to live with peace of mind becomes a step of paramount importance. Strategic community policing is, therefore, also a community empowerment scheme. For this empowerment to be effective, however, local Police Force needs to adequate its own structure and resources to fulfill, both, the expectations of the community as well as those of the Police Force. Hence, the positive move to employ police aids to enhance effective communication between the Police and the members of a local community. Effective proficiency in the foreign but simultaneously local languages is one way to enhance communication between the interested parties – the Police and the members of local communities. In addition, effective Police intelligence gathering also helps to make the right decisions, as opposed to adopting approaches which are based on hear-say, thus hindering success. Above all, it is important to conceive of empowerment of local communities as not only meaning the need to genuinely listening to their concerns but also “making community members active participants in the process of problem solving’,[40] ‘creating a constructive partnership’[41] and ‘reinvigorating communities’.[42] The Police Force ought to be moved by these key factors when decision is made to move closer to local communities. To ensure success in crime reduction, police officers engaged in beat policing, for instance, as a form of community based policing, will need to be adequately trained in community relations and the challenges of youth in underprivileged areas of society.

Critics of beat policing argue that a dilemma in crime reduction is that successful beat policing in reducing crime may cause ‘crime displacement’.[43] This can be true but not impossible to overcome because ‘crime is opportunistic’[44] and ‘protection is only as good as its coverage’.[45] Therefore, community policing can make a real difference to local communities in reducing fear because effective community based policing means policing is more integrated with the security problems and needs of local communities. The strategic importance and value-added effect of community policing are that beat patrol provides for a permanent visibility of police force, not only in residential areas but also where local communities and vulnerable groups perform educational and leisure activities. Such visibility is even more important in areas where the phenomenon of ‘broken windows’,[46] the downgrading of social order occurs. Effective Police-Community partnership can enhance the capacity to manage law and order by ‘impeding “small” (offences) slide by’,[47] thus nurturing the trust of the citizens on their Police Force. If community policing does little to crime deterrence but instead it correlates with crime displacement,[48] one value-added is that the Police Force can understand better some motives of crimes committed within a particular geographical area. Kelling and Coles rightly posit that, in small and homogenous neighborhoods and communities, ‘even the most seriously deranged individuals are known personally to those in the community: everyone knows how far they will go, so their behavior is predictable, even if defiant.’[49] Thus, listening to the community members’ own understanding of the magnitude, frequency and motives of these crimes enhances such understanding. Although crime displacement is a complex phenomenon to prove,[50] relieving community’s stress and not letting the community feel alone in coping with the effects of crime and misconducts, can enhance certainty and minimize ‘social disorganization’;[51] and the ‘inability of local communities to realize their common values or solving commonly experienced serious problems’ can also be overcome.[52] In return, the Police Force gains enhanced legitimacy and respect from their own community – the Police reason d’être. As the Police become more engaged with the local community, familiarity with community concerns about safety is developed, which brings about the responsibility to manage community expectations successfully. This means adopting a two-track approach; giving ‘priority to problems of more current and intense concern’ and balance this by addressing ‘less visible problems of equal magnitude and seriousness, lest the process deteriorate so that the police once again assuming a reactive stance.’[53]

Conclusion

Community based policing is part of the strategy of making the Police Forces more pro-active in response to disturbances and crime within local communities, leading to a Police Force with enhanced legitimacy and a community empowered with problem-solving capacity. There are a number of factors which rightly influence the Police Force to work towards stronger and more strategic engagement with local communities. First, crime cannot be eradicated by the Police Force because the institution is not devised to be crime exterminator. Nevertheless, this is precisely the expectation of the community; that the Police keep the communities safe from crime. Secondly, the Police Force has the responsibility to protect the citizens and the community in general. Therefore, nurturing trust between the Police and the community it exists to serve and to belong is sacrosanct. Third, the Police Force may not be prepared to be crime exterminator but dealing with crimes in ways that makes the community feel safer is a responsibility the Police cannot escape from. Therefore, find the best possible ways is a must. The best ways must include key policing strategies. First, promoting active Police-community interaction to increase the costs of crime; in a gain-pain scenario, the perpetrators rationally make decisions bearing in mind the cost of crime and if the cost unacceptably higher, crime be reduced. Secondly, there is the need to listen and to reinvigorate the community. The fighting spirit, not the surrendering spirit, needs to be upheld within the community so the potential perpetrators do not feel like fish in the ocean but simply fish in a tiny lake, which also requires nurturing an ongoing constructive police-community partnership. The expected outcome, after all, is to create an environment where local communities can be free from fear. As Miller contends, ‘it matters little how economically sound, aesthetically appealing, administratively efficient, or environmentally unobtrusive an area is if the people who live there live in fear. Under such conditions the area will decline.’[54] To stop local communities decline into a disturbance–ridden environment is a noble Police goal, but achieving such a goal requires effective partnership between local communities and their Police Forces. Hence, community based policing!

Reference

Barnes, G, ‘Defining and Optimizing Displacement’, in Crime and Place, J Eck & D Weisbury (eds.), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, pp.95 – 113, Criminal Justice Press, Willow Tree Press, 1995, p.104

Beccaria, C, ‘On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings’, R Bellamy (ed.) & R Davies (trans.), Cambridge university Press, 2003

Bureau of Justice Assistance, ‘Understanding Community Policing – A Framework for Action’, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Response Center, Washington DC, August 1994

Bursik, R, ‘Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency’, Criminology, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.519-551

Cohen, A, Delinquent Boys – The Culture of the Gang’, Free Press, Illinois, USA, 1955

Colquhoun, P, ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, H. Fry, Finsbury – Place, London, UK, 1797

De Becker, The Gift of Fear- and other survival signals that protect us from violence’, Dell Publishing, New York, USA, 1997

Durkheim, E, ‘The Division of Labor’, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, USA, 1947

Eck, J, & Weisburd, D, Crime and Place, Criminal Justice Press, New York, USA, 1995

Edgar, D, Earle, L, & Fopp, R, ‘What is Australian Society?’, Introduction to Australian Society, 2^nd Ed., Prentice Hall, Melbourne, pp.1-15,1993

Goldstein, H, Problem-Oriented Policing, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, USA, 1990

Hillery, G, ‘Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement”, Rural Sociology, 20, 2:111-123, 1995, p.118

Hobbs, T, Man and Citizen, Gert, B (ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, USA, 1991

Hobbs, T, ‘On the citizen’, R Tuck & M Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge University Press, UK, 2005

Jeffery, C, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, SAGE Publications, Inc., California, USA

Kelling, G, & Coles, C, Fixing Broken Windows- Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities’, Touchstone, New York, NY, USA,1996

Levine, M, Broken Windows, Broken Business- How the Smallest Remedies Reap the Biggest Rewards’, Warner Business Books, New York, NY, USA, 2005

Marvel, T & Moody, C, ‘Specification Problems, Police Levels and Crime Rates’, Criminology, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.609 – 646

Mazerolle, P, Adams, K, Budz, D, Cockerill, C, & Vance, M, On the Beat – An Evaluation of beat policing in Queensland’, Crime and Misconduct Commission Research Report, Brisbane, Australia, 2003

Miller, E, ‘Crime’s Threat to Land Value and Neighborhood Vitality, in P Brantingham & P Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology, Waveland Press, Inc., Illinois, USA, 1981

Moore, J, Homeboys – Gangs, Drugs, and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1978

Newman, O, Defensible Space – Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, The Macmillan Company, New York, NY, USA, 1972

Newsquest Media Group, ‘Police take waiting duties at elderly dinner in Welwyn Garden City’, St Albans Review St. Albans, SO January 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.stalbansreview.co.uk

Padgett, T, ‘Peace Through Security – Central America’s crime crisis calls for better policing, not more military’, Time, October 2011

Smith, A, ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Bantam Classic, New York, USA, 2003

The Administrator, ‘Launch of Gang Resistance Education Training (GREAT) Program, Belize’ 20 January, 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.guaridan.bz/all-news/59-other-news/2757-launch-of-gangs-resistance-education...

Weisburd, D, & Green, L, ‘Policing Drug Hot spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment’, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.711 – 735

[1] T Padgett, ‘Peace Through Security – Central America’s crime crisis calls for better policing, not more military’, Time, October 2011, p.54.

[2] D Edgar, L Earle & R Fopp, ‘What is Australian Society?’, Introduction to Australian Society, 2^nd Ed., Prentice Hall, Melbourne, pp.1-15,1993

[3] E Durkheim, ‘The Division of Labor’, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, USA, 1947

[4] A Smith, ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Bantam Classic, New York, USA, 2003

[5] C Beccaria, ‘On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings’, R Bellamy (ed.) & R Davies (trans.), Cambridge university Press, 2003

[6] T Hobbs, ‘Man and Citizen’, B Gert (ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, USA, 1991, p.35

[7] T Hobbs, ‘On the citizen’, R Tuck & M Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge university Press, UK, 2005, p.25

[8] P Colquhoun, ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, H. Fry, Finsbury – Place, London, UK, 1797, pp. xii-xiv

[9] Detailed reference is provided as much as possible in view that those who access this short essay may wish to pursue more in-depth research on the same topic

[10] P Mazerolle, K Adams, D Budz, C Cockerill & M Vance, On the Beat – An Evaluation of beat policing in Queensland’, Crime and Misconduct Commission Research Report, Brisbane, Australia, 2003, p.23

[11] P Mazerolle et. al, p.38

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid, p.39

[14] Ibid, p.88

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid, p.45

[17] Ibid

[18] Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, USA,1990, p.36

[19] Ibid

[20] Thomas Marvel & Carlisle Moody, ‘Specification Problems, Police Levels and Crime Rates’, Criminology, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.609 – 646, p.609

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Newsquest Media Group, ‘Police take waiting duties at elderly dinner in Welwyn Garden City’, St Albans Review St. Albans, SO January 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.stalbansreview.co.uk

[24] The Administrator, ‘Launch of Gang Resistance Education Training (GREAT) Program, Belize’ 20 January, 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.guaridan.bz/all-news/59-other-news/2757-launch-of-gangs-resistance-education...

[25] P Mazerolle et. al, op.cit.

[26] George Hillery, ‘Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement”, Rural Sociology, 20, 2:111-123, 1995, p.118

[27] Emphasis in the original

[28] Ibid, p.117

[29] Oscar Newman, Defensible Space – Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, The Macmillan Company, New York, NY, USA, 1972, p.3

[30] Ibid

[31] Ibid

[32] H Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing,1990, p.91

[33] P Colquhoun, 1797, op.cit, p.xii

[34] David Weisburd & Lorraine Green, ‘Policing Drug Hot spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment’, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.711 – 735, pp. 713-4

[35]Joan Moore, Homeboys – Gangs, Drugs, and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1978

[36] A Cohen, Delinquent Boys – The Culture of the Gang’, Free Press, Illinois, USA, 1955, p.30

[37] Ibid

[38]J Moore, 1978, p.37

[39] G de Becker, The Gift of Fear- and other survival signals that protect us from violence’, Dell Publishing, New York, USA,1997, p.89

[40] Bureau of Justice Assistance, ‘Understanding Community Policing – A Framework for Action’, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Response Center, Washington DC, August 1994, p.vii

[41] Ibid

[42] Ibid

[43] Geoffrey Barnes, ‘Defining and Optimizing Displacement’, in Crime and Place, J Eck & D Weisbury (eds.), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, pp.95 – 113, Criminal Justice Press, Willow Tree Press, 1995, p.104

[44] C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, SAGE Publications, Inc., California, USA, p.229

[45] Ibid, p.228

[46] Michael Levine, Broken Windows, Broken Business- How the Smallest Remedies Reap the Biggest Rewards’, Warner Business Books, New York, NY, USA, 2005, p.1

[47] Ibid

[48] John Eck & David Weisburd, Crime and Place, Criminal Justice Press, New York, USA, 1995, pp.102-3

[49] George Kelling & Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows- Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities’, Touchstone, New York, NY, USA,1996, p.15

[50] Ibid

[51] Robert Bursik, ‘Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency’, Criminology, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.519-551

[52] Ibid, p.521

[53] H Goldstein, ‘Problem-Oriented Policing’, p.79

[54] Eldon Miller, ‘Crime’s Threat to Land Value and Neighborhood Vitality, in P Brantingham & P Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology, Waveland Press, Inc., Illinois, USA, 1981, p.117

INTROSPEKSI DIRI SEBELUM MENJADI PRESIDEN REPUBLIK

2011-12-29T02:17:00.000-08:00

Melengkapi Artikel Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres dan

Dr. Joanico Moreira

Alfredo “Mau-Redo” Ramos da Silva

Demokrasi di Timor Leste kini tumbuh sangat subur bagaikan rumput dan jamur di musim hujan. Kita dapat melihat indikasi suburnya demokrasi di bumi Lorosae dari kualitas pemilihan umum yang semakin berkembang, tingginya kesadaran masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi dalam pemilu, oposisi diakui secara resmi, media sangat kritis dan independen, banyaknya partai politik yang dilahirkan dan banyaknya kandidat Presiden Republik sejak pemilihan presiden 2007 dan juga pasti pada 2012 mendatang. Saat ini diberitakan bahwa sudah ada 22 partai politik dan sekitar 7-14 kandidat yang akan memperebutkan posisi Presiden Republik. Saking banyaknya Partai Politik ini sehingga Dr. Ramos Horta sebagai Presiden Republik dan juga pribadi menghimbau kepada masyarakat untuk tidak memilih partai-partai kecil dan menghimbau juga supaya negara tidak menyediakan anggaran untuk partai-partai kecil yang baru lahir. Walaupun saya sebagai rakyat tidak setuju dengan pendapat itu tetapi biarkanlah wacara atau diskursus PR Horta ini berjalan dan mengalir.

Dalam tulisan ini saya tidak ingin membahas terlalu jauh banyaknya partai politik tetapi tulisan ini akan fokus pada kandidat yang menurut beberapa pihak memiliki peluang besar pada persaingan pemilihan Presiden Republik 2012 nanti. Tulisan ini hanya akan melengkapi tulisan Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres dalam Forum Hakesuk mengenai Taur Matan Ruak dan Lasama. Saya memilih figur Lasama ini karena terinspirasi dan terprovokasi oleh beberapa tulisan yang ditulis Dr. Jose Maria Guterres dengan judul “TL-1 dan Berkah Xanana Gusmao” dan juga tanggapannya Dr. Joanico Moreira terhadap tulisan Dr. Jose Maria Guterres tersebut diatas, yang mana dalam tanggapannya Dr. Joanico Moreira condong membela Lasama, dan sebuah tulisan terakhir yang ditulis oleh Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres di Forum Haksesuk yang juga jelas sekali condong membela Lasama. Dr. Amindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres dalam tulisannya di Forum Haksesuk hanya mengungkap kelemahan Taur Matan Ruak dan LUGU dan tidak menyinggung sedikitpun kelemahan Lasama maka saya hendak memperlihatkan dalam tulisan ini beberapa saja kelemahan Lasama untuk melengkapi tulisan Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres supaya menjadi bahan refleksi bagi Fernando Lasama de Araujo. Umpamanya dikatakan bahwa kelemahan Taur Matan Ruak adalah tidak bisa menerima kritik, kurang peka terhadap masalah persatuan, diskriminatif. Bahkan pada tulisan tangapan terhadap artikel Dr. Jose Maria Guterres, Dr. Joanico mengatakan bahwa Taur berasal dari suku Naueti dan Lasama dari suku Mambae. Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres juga dengan dangkalnya mengatakan bahwa; “Ada indikasi CNRT lebih condong ke Taur Matan Ruak, tetapi mereka juga harus berhati-hati karena mereka juga masih ingin memerintah. Perhitungan rasional bila ingin mengamankan pembentukan sebuah pemeritahan koalisi maka dukungan Xanana dan CNRT kepada Lasama adalah lebih rasional, sebab kekuatan PD adalah nyata, mereka mempunyai 8 wakil de Parlamen Nasional dan pada Kongres Nasional ke II, PD mampu menggerakan 7.000 orang lebih ke GMT. Diperkirakan suara PD akan bertambah dan akan sangat menentukan pembentukkan sebuah pemerintah koalisi ada indikasi”. Perkiraan “Dr. Armindo Mauk-Sun Guterres” di atas patut diperdebatkan. Harus diingat bahwa tidak hanya CNRT yang mau memerintah lagi, tetapi PD juga sangat bernafsu untuk memerintah lagi meski belum tentu dapat memenangi atau menjadi kuda hitam dalam Pemilu 2012. Melihat konsolidasi yang CNRT dan Partai lain lakukan sangat gencar di Ermera dipastikan bahwa PD akan kehilangan dukungan di Ermera karena setelah katuas Fitun meninggal dunia, massa Ermera banyak yang terpencar termasuk Komandante Dudu yang mendukung Taur Matan Ruak menjadi Presiden Republik. Sedangkan di Suai melihat dukungan yang ada jelas antara Fretilin dan CNRT akan bersaing ketat. Maliana walaupun Arcangelo Leite berasal dari sana tetapi Maliana adalah basis CNRT. Sedangkan di bagian Baucau, Lospalos dan Viqueque dipastikan antara Fretilin dan CNRT karena PD di sana mati kutu. Bagaimana mungkin dikatakan bahwa PD akan mengalami peningkatan kursinya di Parlemen Nasional..? Menurut beberapa pihak bahwa PD kemungkinan besar akan kehilangan banyak suara karena suara itu pindah ke CNRT, PDN dan juga Fretilin. Indikasinya mulai terlihat dalam berbagai konsolidasi militante PD banyak yang mendeklarasikan diri untuk berafiliasi ke CNRT dan Fretilin. Bahkan di kalangan orang PD banyak yang mengatakan bahwa “ami membro PD nafatin maibe ami vota ba Maun Xanana lai”. Dr. “Mau-Sun” Guterres mengatakan PD akan menfasilitasi CNRT untuk membentuk sebuah pemerintahan karena ada kursi di Parlemen. Xanana dan CNRT sudah tahu betul para Menteri dan Sekretaris Negara dari PD selama ini. CNRT juga mungkin sudah kapok dengan isu-isu korupsi dan skandal lain dikaitkan dengan para Menteri dan Sekretaris Negara dari PD. Dan perbuatan pembangkangan PD terhadap Xanana di parlemen tentang 200 juta USD dll untuk OGE 2012. Pada sebuah polling dilakukan di website CNRT sangat menarik. Dalam polling itu publik ditanyai, tuir itaboot, partido ida nebe mak diak liu ba CNRT hodi halo koaligasaun..? jawabannya adalah Hamrik Mesak (ukun mesak) 55,4 %, CNRT-PD 20,7 %, CNRT-Fretilin 19 %, CNRT-ASDT 2,7 % dan CNRT-PSD 2.2 %. Olehnya opsi bagi CNRT sangat banyak bukan hanya PD saja. Jangan percaya diri dulu bung. Sampai di sini mari kita menuju pada gambaran calon Presiden Republik dari Partai Demokrat, Fernando Lasama de Araujo.

Fernando Lasama de Araujo, adalah tokoh muda yang memimpin Renetil di Indonesia pada zaman perjuangan. Renetil organisasi resistensi yang berpengaruh di kalangan terpelajar di Indonesia karena memiliki jaringan di kalangan pemuda dan pelajar Timor Leste, juga jaringan di kalangan intelektual Indonesia. Pasca kemerdekaan Lasama bersama-sama dengan koleganya ex-anggota Renetil dan juga beberapa pihak ex-FPI CNRT mendirikan Partai Politik yang mereka beri nama Partido Demokratico. Menurut kabar bahwa pada awalnya mereka menginginkan Lucia Lobato menjadi Presiden Partai tetapi karena Lucia Lobato sendiri sudah di PSD sehingga mereka memilih Lasama memimpin partai politik tersebut. Lasama sedikit-demi sedikit karir politiknya mulai menanjak seteleh partainya mendapat 7 kursi di pemilihan umum 2002. Bahkan pada tahun 2007 partai politik yang dipimpin Lasama tersebut hanya meningkat satu kursi sehingga mereka mendapat 8 kursi di Parlemen Nacional. Namun Lasama gagal untuk menjadi Presiden Republik walaupun dalam kampanyenya pada saat itu menjanjikan supaya petisioner yang dipecat dari FALINTIL-FDTL untuk kembali ke FALINTIL-FDTL kalau dia menjadi Presiden Republik atau Comandante Supremo FALINTIL-FDTL. Gagal menjadi Presiden Republik Lasama malah sukses dipilih oleh AMP menjadi Presiden Parlemen Nasional selama lima tahun. Dalam kepemimpinan di Parlemen Nacional Lasama lumayan bagus. Walaupun banyak persoalan tidak terselesaikan. Namun banyak pihak mulai melihat bahwa Lasama adalah tokoh muda yang di masa akan datang menjadi solusi alternatif bagi masyarakat Timor Leste. Namun demikian banyak kendala yang masih dihadapi Lasama kalau dia ingin mentransfer dirinya menjadi pemimpin masa depan. Yang saya fokuskan adalah Lasama harus bisa mentransfer dirinya bukan ditransfer oleh orang atau institusi lain. Seorang mantan anggota Renetil yang berada di Partai lain mengatakan bahwa “Lasama selama ini dibesarkan oleh Renetil dan PD tetapi dia tidak pernah atau belum pernah ia membesarkan dirinya sendiri”. Oleh karena itu, banyak faktor yang masih menjadi tantangan dan hambatan bagi Lasama agar bisa meraih Presiden Republik. Faktor-faktor tersebut sebagai berikut:

1). Publik belum tahu visi dan misi Lasama bagi masa depan negara dan bangsa ini. Kalau kita memperhatikan pesan-pesan yang disampaikan oleh Lasama di Parlemen tampak tidak teratur dan tidak sistematik dan tanpa “kontiudo” yang jelas. Pesan yang tidak beraturan tersebut menunjukan tidak adanya visi dan misi yang hendak disampaikan oleh Lasama secara pribadi. Jika di bandingkan dengan Mariano Asanami Sabino maka sangat berbeda. Mariano memiliki visi dan misi yang jelas dan terfokus sedangkan Lasama kasihan sekali. Olehnya seperti dikatakan di atas, Lasama harus membesarkan dirinya dan mengtransfer diri dan visinya kepada publik bukan dibesarkan oleh institusi dan juga orang lain.

2). Hubungan Lasama dan FALINTIL-FDTL. Lasama adalah orang yang dalam kampanye pencalonan Presidennya tahun 2007 melakukan dua kesalahan besar terhadap FALINTIL-FDTL;pertama, menuduh FALINTIL-FDTL melakukan pembunuhan massal di Tasi Tolu. Yang kemudian setelah dilakukan investigasi oleh UN, pembunuhan massal yang dituduhkan oleh Lasama dan istrinya Jaquelin Aquino Siapno (orang Filipina) tidak terbukti. Artinya menfitnah FALINTIL-FDTL demi kepentingan politik regionalismenya. Kedua, menjanjikan kepada petisioner untuk kembali ke FALINTIL-FDTL jika dia terpilih menjadi Presiden Republik. Dua hal tersebut akan menghambat hubungan Lasama dan FALINTIL-FDTL kalau Lasama terpilih menjadi Komandan Supremo. Banyak pihak yang meragukan hubungan Lasama dan FALINTIL-FDTL apalagi kini Chefe Estado Maior General Lere Anan Timor. Orang yang dulu dituduh diskriminatif oleh Lasama dan kelompoknya pada tahun 2007. Lasama mesti perbaiki hubungan dengan FALINTIL-FDTL kalau ingin menjadi Presiden Republik. Walaupun mungkin FALINTIL-FDTL sudah mengampuni Lasama dan istrinya Jaqueline Aquino Siapno.

3). Lasama memiliki karakter yang kurang peka terhadap isu gender. Lasama sering terlibat dalam Violencia Domestika terhadap istrinya. Sampai istrinya, Jaqueline Aquino Siapno melarikan diri ke rumah Menteri Luar Negeri Zakarias Albano untuk sementara waktu karena tidak tahan siksaan yang dilakukan Lasama. Di Timor Leste terutama pemerintah AMP sekarang ini sedang gencar mendorong pengembangan dan pembangunan isu Gender dan mengurangi violencia domestika serta violasaun seksual. Sebaliknya Lasama justru memukuli istrinya sehingga di internet dipublikasikan secara gencar dan luas. Seorang lider jika dia sukses memimpin keluarganya maka dia akan sukses pula memimpin negaranya. Jika saat ini Lasama sedang dalam bui, Ramos-Horta sebagai Presiden tentu tidak akan memberikan indultu kepada Lasama karena terlibat dalam violência domestika. Kalau Lasama ingin menjadi Presiden Republik perbaiki atetudnya agar tidak mengulangi lagi violencia domestika. Asal Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres dan pendukung Lasama lainnya tahu saja bahwa Taur Matan Ruak walaupun dari militer tetapi dia tidak pernah melakukan violencia domestik terhadap istrinya seperti apa yang Lasama lakukan selama ini.

4). Alkohol dan Mabuk. Di Timor Leste banyak pengusaha yang memasukan minuman beralkohol untuk diperdagangkan ditambah lagi dengan “tua sabu” sehingga kekerasan yang sering terjadi juga disebabkan oleh alkohol. Tetapi yang menarik bahwa tidak hanya anak muda yang meminum alkohol tetapi menurut informasi yang beredar bahwa Lasama adalah seorang yang kecanduan alkohol tersebut. Bahkan Membru Guverno anterior mencerikan bahwa “dalam suatu kesempatan berkunjung ke Portugal Lasama meminum minuman keras lebih banyak sehingga mabuk dan muntah-muntah di acara resmi”. Saya berharap cerita ini tidak benar tetapi kalau ini benar maka sebaiknya perbaiki diri sebelum jadi Presiden Republik.

5). Regionalisme dan Etnik. Lasama orang yang selama ini lebih mengutamakan dan secara diam-diam mendengungkan isu Loromunu dan Lorosae. Ketika para petisioner dipecat dari FALINTIL-FDTL Lasama dan Partai Demokratnya termasuk yang melakukan kampanye hitam dan mengutamakan superioritas Loromunu. Seorang pendukung Lasama dalam tulisannya untuk menanggapi tulisan Dr. Jose Maria Guterres mengatakan bahwa Lasama adalah Mambae Mayoritas dan Taur Matan Ruak adalah Naueti yang minoritas. Jelas sekali bahwa diskriminasi ada pada Lasama dan pendukungnya secara mengakar dan sudah menyatu dengan darah dan daging mereka. Dalam sebuah rekrutmen PNTL Lasama selalu memperhatikan kalangannya. Bahkan dalam sebuah seremoni di Ainaro baru-baru ini Lasama menyuruh Deputado TARA untuk memaksa orang Mambae untuk memilih Lasama padahal pada saat itu yang hadir adalah para Veteran untuk melakukan syukuran demobilisasi yang diorganisir oleh Xanana. Perintah Lasama terhadap Deputadu TARA adalah wajar karena di desanya sendiri Lasama dan Partai Demokrat tidak pernah menang, sehingga harus menggunakan isu etnik seperti mereka gunakan pada krisis 2006 lalu.

6). Operasaun Konjunto. Dalam situasi susah dan genting Lasama diberikan mandat oleh konstitusi untuk menjadi Presiden Republik. Lasama yang menandatangani dan memberikan komando untuk melakukan OPERASAUN KONJUNTO atau OPERASAUN HALIBUR. Hal ini diakui oleh Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres (alumni UNTIM) sambil mengutip pernyataan Lasama dalam kongres PD baru-baru ini: “nudar estado de direito demokratico ita tenke atua tuir lei ho firmeza. La iha fatin e toleransia ba sira nebe mak viola lei no sira nebe mak uza violencia hanesan instrumento hodi atinzi sira nia objectivo. Tamba ida ne’e mak iha tinan 2008 wain hira hau assume kargo nudar Presidente da Republika interinu, atu defende dignidade e interese nacional estado e povo ida ne’e nian, ho firmeza, hau hamutuk ho orgaun soberano sira seluk, hola desizaun ida nebe ema barak kontra ho hakanek sidadaun balun nia fuan, maybe ami tenki hola duni, mak hari operasaun konjunto, PNTL-FFDTL, hodi normaliza no estabiliza hikas situasaun siguransa iha rai laran. Ida ne’e hatudu katak orgaun soberano sira Timor Leste nian laos halo esforso deit, maibe atua ho firme, solidu, no koezo hodi buka solusaun ba problema todan ne’ebe nasaun hasoru. Ita tenki konsiente katak dignidade no interese estado no povu nian aas liu kualker forsa politika ka lider politiku ida nian dignidade no interese”.

Akan tetapi pernyataan Lasama itu tidak jujur kalau tidak dilengkapi dengan cerita di bawah ini; dalam suatu kesempatan menurut sumber yang dapat dipercaya bahwa ketika Lasama sebagai Comandante Supremo telah memerintahkan Panglima F-FDTL saat itu, Taur Matan Ruak untukmenembaki para petisioner. “Tempo ona para tiru deit kuando sira la fo ulun”, kata Lasama. Tetapi perintah Lasama ini ditanggapi oleh Taur Matan Ruak bahwa “Sr. Presidente Republika, seidauk tempo para tiru tamba ita manan funu la’os tamba ita oho ema barak maibe tamba inimigu rende mas kilat la tarutu”. Mendengar jawaban ini Lasama terdiam. Seandainya perintah Lasama ini dilaksanakan oleh Taur sudah dipastikan bahwa banyak orang yang akan menjadi Korban Operasi Konjuntu, terutama di Ermera. Yang menarik bahwa mungkin Lasama adalah seorang demokrat sejati yang memerintahkan penembakan yang bisa berimplikasi kepada rakyat Ermera yang menjadi pendukung Partai Demokrat dalam pemilihan umum 2007. Atau mungkin ini jebakan buat F-FDTL supaya bisa dituduh lagi melakukan pembunuhan massal sebagaimana di Tasi Tolu. Untungnya Taur Matan Ruak tidak terjebak dalam perintah yang disampaikan Lasama pada sore itu dalam sebuah pertemuan.

7). Persoalan Korupsi dan Kolusi kendaraan Parlemen Nasional. Sebagai Presiden Parlemen Nasional, Lasama termasuk yang bertanggungjawab terhadap perubahan spesifikasi kendaraan anggota Parlemen Nasional dari Toyota ke Mitsubishi Pajero. Seandainya ini ditelusuri maka akan terkait dengan kepentingan kelompok yang Lasama pimpin selama ini, baik itu di dalam maupun yang sedang di luar-luar mencari proyek. Katanya kasus ini sedang di Precurador Geral. Kalau mau jadi Presiden Republik perbaiki dan bangun menejemen modern bukan menejemen aktivista.

8). Kepercayaan Xanana. Dalam tulisan Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres juga mengatakan bahwa Lasama adalah orang yang dekat dengan Xanana dan kehadiran Xanana di Kongres PD adalah indikasi dukungan secara tidak langsung kepada Lasama. Menurut saya, Xanana sulit diprediksi sehingga saya tidak tahu bahwa kehadirannya merupakan dukungan atau justru sebaliknya. Tetapi yang pasti adalah Xanana kecewa terhadap Partai Demokrat dan Lasama karena jelas-jelas mempermalukan Xanana di Parlemen Nasional pada siding OGE 2012. Lasama dan kelompoknya “vota kontra” terhadap anggaran 200 juta USD yang diprogramkan Xanana. Padahal dalam rapat konsolidasi di luar parlemen, sebelum debat anggaran di PN, katanya Xanana sudah menjelaskan kepada Lasama dan anggota Parlemen AMP. Tetapi lagi-lagi Lasama dan kelompoknya dengan aroganya menolak mentah-mentah program pemerintah 200 juta USD tersebut bahkan Lasama mengatakan Xanana seharusnya menjelaskan kepadanya kalau itu penting. Seorang teman yang dekat dengan Lasama tapi sudah tersingkir dalam Kongres PD Kedua kemarin menceritakan kepada saya bahwa pada krisis 2008 ketika Operasi Konjuntu juga Xanana marah besar kepada Lasama karena Lasama dan kelompoknya berstandar ganda.

9). Lasama dan Partainya walaupun mendatangkan massa yang lumayan banyak dalam Kongres keduanya bulan kemarin tetapi hal ini diragukan untuk memenangkan Lasama menjadi Presiden Republik. Hipotesis Dr. Armindo “Mauk Sun” Guterres bahwa kehadiran Xanana di kongres merupakan dukungan langsung atau tidak langsung terhadap Lasama adalah suatu harapan akan pentingnya Xanana bagi Lasama dan PD. Xanana memang memiliki hubungan yang baik dengan PD karena Xanana-lah yang mengorbankan uang dari sakunya untuk membersarkan PD ketika PD masih menjadi oposisi dan kere. Menurut sumber dalam PD sendiri mengatakan bahwa Chico Borlako dan Paul Assis sering mengunjungi Palacio das Cinsas membawa bornal untuk mengambil uang demi membiayai aktivitas PD saat itu. Tapi harus diakui bahwa PD sekarang sudah berbeda dengan PD yang dulu. PD sekarang adalah PD yang punya banyak uang. Uang dari Lasama, Mariano Asanami, Dominggos Caero, Marcus da Cruz, Arcangelo Leite, dan Florindo. Dulu semua orang tahu, Menteri dan Sekretaris Negara dari PD yang berprofesi sebagai dosen kalau habis ngajar selalu meminta mahasiswanya untuk ngantar pulang karena belum punya kendaraan, tetapi sekarang…? Empat tahun yang lalu pada hari pertama mau dilantik sebagai anggota kabinet di pemerintahan AMP, ada anggota kabinet tertunjuk dari PD yang meminjam móbil orang dan naik motor untuk sampai pada tempat acara pelantikan, tetapi sekarang…? Dimana KAK (Komisaun Anti-Korupsaun) melihat hal ini..? Apakah karena para Komisioner KAK adalah individu-individu dari Renetil maka sangat sulit bagi KAK untuk menjamah temannya sendiri..? KAK benar-benar kepanjangan dari “Kawan Amankan Kawan”…? Sesama Renetil akan sulit untuk saling “mencakar” karena sebelum menjadi anggota Renetil di Bali-Jawa diterapkan acara ritwal hemu-ran(minum darah) sebagai tanda sumpah setia sesama anggota Renetil…? Dan menyangkut dukungan Xanana, bagaimana mungkin Xanana suporta Lasama kalau Lasama sendiri tidak mampu rapatkan barisannya untuk mendukunnya. Para veteran berpengaruh seperti Dudu, Tuloda, Deker, Paul Assis, Maubere tidak mendukung Lasama untuk menjadi Presiden Republik pada 2012 meskipun mereka orang-orang PD.

Saya sepakat dengan Dr. Armindo “Mauk-Sun” Guterres bahwa pada akhirnya semuanya kembali kepada rakyat. Rakyatlah yang akan memilih dan memilih suara emas pada Pilihan Presiden 2012 akan datang. Pemimpin yang suka berdusta dan ngalor ngidul akan disinkirkan, pemimpin yang tidak bermoral akan dinistakan, pemimpin yang diskriminatif akan di nafikkan, pemimpin yang tidak memiliki visi akan disiasiakan, pemimpin yang korup akan dihukum, pemimpin yang irasional dengan isu etnik akan diabaikan. Akhirnya rakyat akan memilih pemimpin yang santun, bijak, mengayomi, merakyat, merangkul dan memperjuangkan kepentingan rakyat. Introspeksilah sebelum menjadi Presiden Republik. Akhirnya saya berharap dan menunggu ada pendukung Lasama yang menanggapi tulisan ini agar dapat membuka mata dan telingga rakyat agar mereka tidak akan merasa memilih kucing dalam karung.

Ex-Mahasiswa UNTIM

Povo Aileba hela iha Comoro

Dili

KM Hamonu sentenca Kontra Arte Marsiais Maibe PNTL ninia Boot hatais mos Hatais Farda Arte Marsiais

2011-12-27T04:25:00.000-08:00

Konsellu Ministru hala’o Sorumutu Estraordinária iha Kinta-feira ne’e, loron 22 fulan Dezembru tinan 2011, iha sala Sorumutu Konsellu Ministru, Palásiu Governu Dili no aprova ona: Medida hirak ne’ebé destinada hodi garante ordem públika no Seguransa Interna País nian, "Deklara iha komunikadu de imprensa nebe jornal nee asesu.

Nota ba imprensa nee hatutan, "Haree ba insidente daudaun ne’ebé envolve grupu arte- marsiál, iha Dili no distritu sira seluk- hanesan iha Zumalai/Suai-Covalima, Ainaro no Lautém- ne’ebé provoca distúrbiu sériu hanesan estraga sasan, mate no kanek, Konsellu Ministru rona Komandante Distritál Dili, Polísia Nasionál Timor-Leste (PNTL), Pedro Belo, no Komisáriu PNTL, Afonso de Jesus ne’ebé aprezenta relatóriu detalla ida kona-ba situasaun seguransa interna País nian."

Konfrontasaun entre grupu arte marsiais ne'e la'os mosu deit iha tinan nee maibe mosu fila2 dezde TL ukun an.

Governu foo lembra katak, "Maski halo beibeik deklarasaun ba kompromisu sira, husi reprezentante diresaun grupu arte-marsiál sira oioin, atu salva guarda respeitu ba prinsípiu konvivénsia sosiál, hodi asina ona dokumentu ida ne’ebé husi nível aas nian, iha fulan Maiu tinan 2011, ne’ebé mak grupu sira halo tiha juramentu atu kontribui ba ambiente pás no estabilidade iha País, verifika katak iha nafatin violasaun sistemátika ida ba akordu ida ne’e."

Iha okaziaun hanesan Konsellu Ministru ne'ebe lidera direitamente husi PM Xanana Gusmao ne'e mós dehan, "analiza efeitu negativu husi joga bola guling no lataria, ne’ebé mak afeta bem- estar sosiál no halakon virtude valór morál no étiku foin sa’e no família sira nian, hodi kontribui ba violénsia, mak hanesan violénsia doméstika, no liu-liu ba sosiedade tomak la hetan hakmatek."

"Iha sentidu ne’e, ho Natal, Tinan Foun no Eleisaun ba tinan 2012 hakbesik daudaun, IV Governu Konstitusionál konsidera urjente hodi foti medida ne’ebé adekuada hodi garante seguransa no bem-estar ba populasaun."

"Nune’e Konsellu Ministru, liu husi análize ida ne’ebé klean kona-ba relatóriu ne’ebé hato’o husi Komando Jerál PNTL nian, rezolve suspende to’o loron 21 fulan Dezembru tinan 2012, autorizasaun ba prátika atividade hotu-hotu grupu arte marsiál sira nian ne’ebé hetan prova katak provoka dsitúrbiu, violénsia no krime, inklui proibisaun treinu no prátika arte-marsiál sira, nune’e mós obrigasaun absoluta atu labele halo mobilizasaun ba ema sira hodi tama iha grupu sira ne’ebé mak pratika arte marsiál sira. Suspensaun ida ne’e sei renova fali iha periódu sira ne’ebé hanesan tinan ida nian kontra grupu hotu-hotu ne’ebé mak viola medida suspensaun ba prátika arte-marsiál sira."

Iha foto grafia balun ne'ebe mosu iha publiku hatudu momoos ulun boot PNTL ninian hatais hela farda Arte marsiais ida ne'ebe sempre involve iha konfrontasaun. Tuir fontes jornal nee katak foto ne'e atu entrega ba ulun boot governu ninian.

"Sei aplika “ toleránsia zero” ba membru PNTL no F-FDTL sira hotu ne’ebé partisipa iha atividade grupu arte marsiál sira nian, sira sei hetan aplikasaun ba sansaun displinár, inklui demisaun instituisaun nian rasik, tuir termu lei orgánika no estatutu disiplinár sira," KM ameasa.

"Ha'u hanoin ne'e dala ida tan hanesan gertakan ida. Se karik Governu seriu entaun kaer uluk mak boot sira ne'ebe hatais farda arte marsiais ninian," dehan estudante UNTL ida nebe husu atu labele publika ninia naran.

Liu tan nia sadik PM ninia beran hodi dehan, "se PM promete no barani atu hasai komandante PNTL ne'e entaun ami sei buka meus aprezenta fotografia ne'e ba avo PM."

Antes tama Natal mosu konfrontasaun entre grupu balun iha jogu bola guling iha hotel Luz Clarita ninia oin ne'ebe rezulta ema balun hetan kanek tan ba sona no estragus ba motor nune'e governu repete hikas ameasas ne'ebe halo ona iha fulan hirak kotuk ba hodi dehan, "Konsellu Ministru rezolve ona hodi impede mós jogu bola guling no lotaria iha teritóriu Nasionál Timor- Leste hahú husi loron 22 fulan Dezembru tinan 2011."

"Iha fatin públiku ka privadu, ne’ebé hala’o prátika atividade ne’ebé halo parte rezolusaun ida ne’e sei taka kedas. Sei revoga fali áktu hotu-hotu ne’ebé hetan lisensa ka autorizasaun prátika atividade ne’ebé halo parte iha dekretu-lei ida ne’e."

Corruption and the Police Force: “Crime data leaked to bikie gangs”

2011-12-20T04:43:00.003-08:00

Article BY Agio Pereira

Introduction

‘Crime data leaked to bikie gangs’ is the title of a story published in Sydney Morning Herald, August 28, 2010. The content of this news should not be alarming, unless one considers its political, economic and cultural dimensions. It is about the infamous Comancheros ‘allegedly involved in organised crime, including drug trafficking and extortion’. It is also about the Comancheros having access to ‘more than a dozen NSW police files’ which compromised not only ‘up to eight criminal investigations,’ but also ‘jeopradised the safety of undercover police.’ Hence ‘the leaks are regarded by policing officials as among the worst cases of suspected corruption in the NSW police force in the past five years.’ This piece is also related to the story aired by ABC Four Corners, the investigative television program, famous for its ‘The Moonlight State’ program that brought about the Fitzgerald Inquiry on corruption in the police and politics and subsequent demise of Premier Bjelke Petersen of Queensland. Media sensationalism aside, this essay is to be an informed dissertation, with analysis and evaluation on how informative and representative, or otherwise, this story is, and whether there is a strategic importance to policing. Hence, it includes discussion of corruption risk, police and procedures, as well as relevance to the present and how the substance of this story can shape the future. Possible implications to cause-effect and human resources, corruption and police integrity issues are also considered.

The impact of corruption on the Police Force

Corruption, integrity and policing

What is police corruption? - Sayed and Bruce argue that ‘public outburst against the police surfacing time and again’ and not only ‘misconduct’ and ‘corruption’ often ‘used interchange-ably,’ but increasingly ‘one cannot be sure if corruption refers to all crimes committed by the police, acts of gross or even minor negligence or incompetence, or just any behaviuor seen to be inappropriate.’ Police corruption can, thus, be defined as ‘any illegal conduct or misconduct involving the use of occupational power for personal, group or organisational gain.’ Hence, ‘to be considered corrupt, an act must be a violation of…criminal or civil law or qualify as misconduct’ under applicable regulations and ‘it must use either the legal or organisational powers of the police.’ That is, ‘the committing of the act needs to have been facilitated by the some form of power, knowledge, access, credibility or other means available to an officer by virtue of…being a member of the police service,’ including ‘motivated by the desire to achieve some identifiable personal, group or organisational benefit or reward.’ Thus, motivation, legal framework, misuse of power derived from being a police officer, are prerequisites to determine a corrupt or misconduct act.

Police ‘pride and humility’ are important to ensure a clean corporate image and public trust. It is reasonable to expect that the Police become a target of those who strive for success beyond the boundaries of acceptable moral and ethical norms. Therefore, developing and sustaining a strong image of police integrity is a challenging strategic priority for the Police leadership. Reporting on police corruption, such as ‘Something rotten in the state of Victoria’ and ‘Lennon Speaks at police corruption probe’, does not help Police integrity, albeit the Police Force in Australia, so far, succeeds in maintaining a credible institutional image. Fijnaut and Huberts contend that public integrity ‘denotes the quality of acting in accordance with the moral values, norms and rules accepted by the body politic and the public’ and that corruption is ‘a type of integrity violation’ because it is essentially the ‘misuse of public power for private benefit’. Thus, distinguishing public from private domain is essential for the understanding of police corruption. As for police professionalism, it is important to gauge its relation to ethics and morality, because public ethics, are ‘the collection of values and norms in the public sector’, the standards or yardsticks used to assess the integrity of one’s conduct.

Being the only law enforcement institution with the power to use force on behalf of the State to curb violence and deviance, acting within the realms of ethics, morality and public expectations for protection at all times is crucial. Arrest the burglars, get criminals out of sight, stop the nuisances, are all part of community expectations, not least, successful policing performance. Beyond this, in the current era of ‘complementary service provision’ with private policing, security and body guards, with diverse type of crimes such as cybercrime, media globalisation and evolving ‘social structure, the Police Force, as a public institution, has to lead by example. Measuring corruption in all fronts ‘to diagnose problems and monitor results’ ought to be part of management of the working environment. However, monitoring undercover police work against corruption is not easy. Quantifying the work of the police can also bring about an erroneous understanding of police performance, including ignoring possible implications of ‘the element of danger’, which ‘is so integral to the policeman’s work that explicit recognition might induce emotional barriers to work performance’. Police presence and existence alone, if perceived with due respect and integrity, already contributes towards a harmonious social environment and safety. If for no other reason, it makes crime more difficult to be committed, without being caught, making the community safer and more confident to carry on work and leisure activities.

Risks, cost and origins

Corruption and crime in general take place because of available opportunities and manageable risks. At organisational level, corruption in the police force is said to manifest in two forms; one at individual level, ‘in isolation from colleagues’, and another at group level known as ‘internally-networked corruption.’ The former is said to be more common than the letter, at least based on intelligence data pertaining to the Police Force of England and Wales. ‘Information compromise’, as seen in the ‘Crime data leaked to bikie gangs’ story, is considered to be ‘the most single common type of corrupt activity. This includes leaking information to the media and ‘deliberate leaks to criminals’.Curtailing the opportunities pertaining to information leaks can be costly. Police ‘databases, files or documents’ will require expensive means of technology, human resources training and knowledge updating to be able to minimise risks. Adding to the problem, there is the Police subculture of solidarity, tagged as ‘The Code’, ‘The Code of Silence’, or ‘The Blue Curtain’.The Code ‘informally prohibits or discourages police officers from reporting the misconduct of their colleagues.’ Thus, eradicating corruption can be extremely difficult, unless the institution is to replace existing human resources - an unrealistic option because the existing human resources are strategic assets. This makes curbing police corruption equally an important strategic issue, particularly in the context of reforming the Police Force. One reason is that the process of reform needs to equate with the need for ‘specialization’ of key Police units, which ‘facilitates the placing of responsibility, the training of the members, the development of experts, and the promotion of esprit de corps’. More importantly, this ‘stimulates special police interest and usually arouses an increased public interest.’

Therefore, identifying the root causes and effects is the crucial. Two types of factors distinguish the origins of police corruption. One is ‘work factor’ and another is ‘non-work factor’. Apart from opportunities for corruption, work factors include ‘professional attitudes/behaviour’ and ‘organisational culture/values’. The non-work factors include ‘domestic/personal problems’ and ‘social networks with criminals’. This suggests that the social environment, the history and personal relationships of police officers, together with the nature of policing, impact on the probability of becoming corrupt. Dealing with the development of Police Force, therefore, requires a holistic approach, including understanding and supplanting the weaknesses of Police officers. This means institutional support, such as providing adequate leadership for the social environment so that officers can be equipped with the right attitude and strength to overcome the temptations of corruption. Such an approach, coupled with coercive and administrative measures, can protect the environment of the Police Force against the tendency to adopt behaviors, which may be qualified as corrupt, or misconduct.

Furthermore, the risk of corruption in the Police Force, by virtue of its work, is a constant process. Police has power that organisations and criminal groups constantly attempt to purchase. Power of information, power to look the other way, power to provide protection and power to inculcate false information, are amongst some key aspects of power those operating outside the boundaries of law may need; and the Police Force is potential supplier. Hence, even if police reforms are undertaken successfully, ‘continual vigilance and skepticism is vital’ because, as Newman posits:

The causes of corruption include: factors that are intrinsic to policing as a job; the nature of police organisations; the nature of ‘police occupational culture’ and stressor; the opportunities for corruption presented by the ‘political’ and ‘task’ environments; and the nature and extent of the effort put in to controlling corruption.

The latter of the key factors underpins the importance of keeping the police working environment with high sense of ‘professional pride’, which Newman identifies as crucial, but this needs to be contemplated as ‘the consequence of long-term reform efforts’.

The economic and environmental factor, justice and fairness

Bearing in mind the cost of fighting corruption in general and in the Police Force in particular, focusing on preventative measures, rather than entirely on ‘deterrence via the threat of prosecution,’ is a wise strategy. Professional pride can help curbing corruption within the Police Force. In the very least, it can influence more vulnerable departments of the Force to avoid being a ‘petri dish for corruption’. Salary level, albeit not the only factor, is important incentive. This should be combined with an attractive retirement scheme, including access to permanent housing by Police Officers and their families. Rodney Fink argues that ‘the prestige enjoyed by government officials within any given society, the value of their remuneration relative to the attainment of a reasonably secure and comfortable standard of living, their job security and work environment, and their institution’s commitment to their own professional development’, impact on vulnerability towards corruption. Another economic factor is having ‘underpaid and unmotivated public officials’ administering government rules and regulations. Under such circumstance, ‘the incentives to pay bribes are high, and the benefits seem obvious –private firms and citizens can go about their business,’ noting that, ironically, ‘individual bribes sometimes not only benefit the payer and the recipient but also enhance overall efficiency of fairness’. This may reflect human greed dilemma; the temptation to accumulate wealth, disregarding fairness and adopting the principle that the end justifies the mean. It is wise to bear in mind what Amartya Sen posits:

Wealth is not something we value for its own sake. Nor is it invariably a good indicator of what kind of lives we can achieve on the basis of our wealth. A person with severe disability cannot be judged to be more advantaged merely because she has a larger income or wealth than her able-bodied neighbour. Indeed, a richer person with disability may be subject to many restraints that the poorer person without the physical disadvantage may not have. In judging the advantages that the different people have compared with each other, we have to look at the overall capabilities they manage to enjoy.’

As for fairness, it is a principle derived from justice, which Rawls contend, is based on principles ‘chosen behind a veil of ignorance’, It follows that fighting police corruption needs to equate with economic justice as well as ‘realization-focused’, concentrating ‘on the actual behavior of people, rather than presuming compliance by all with ideal behavior’. Hence the need to create within the Police Force ‘an environment open to public scrutiny and in which the law and administrative procedures clearly define the obligations of public officials to be accountable for their stewardship of public resources’. Corruption, albeit not a disability in itself, if not eradicated, can render the police institution into a state of disability, regardless of its important wealth: its human resources. Having a frame of aspirations ‘worth striving for’ is crucial. Thus, equipping Police personnel with constant sense of pride makes the Force bound to be trusted and respected for its hard work - for the sake of common good. To be fair for the Police Force, however, criticisms need to be balanced against government policies and other real world challenges. Often, for politics sake, governments may pressure the Police to adopt a ‘zero tolerance’ strategy, projecting the perception of ‘a disciplinary society, an electronic panopticon, risk society, actuarial justice or a society of control’.

Commissions of Inquiry: challenges and reforms

Since there are many factors making police corruption a difficult trend to curtail, the work of the Commissions of Inquiry is inexorably complex and its important impact underestimated. Nevertheless, Commissions of Inquiry can also waste money if carrying on with inquiries ‘we have to have’, as in the case of ICAC in Sydney, inquiring about McGurk’s ‘bluster and hot air’ claims of ‘high level corruption within the NSW government’. Royal Commissions can also unknowingly employ corrupt police officers as in the case of Ian Harrison inquiry into corrupt police, which endangered the integrity of the process of inquiry, due to information leak and other possible crimes. ICAC in NSW seem to induce limited impact on eradication of corruption from the NSW Police Force because, as the article selected for this essay claims, ‘the Comancheros, received leaked police intelligence gathered by multiple agencies’, due to the ‘infiltration of state and federal drugs investigations’, ‘described as one of the worst examples of corruption in the NSW police in recent years’. Other challenges include ‘the lack of immediate victims willing to report corruption’ and much of the corrupt act takes place ‘in the presence of witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable’,providing advantage to the corrupt Police elements.

There are reasons for optimism. Apart from ‘education in ethics, proactive and reactive investigation of corruption, integrity testing, and corruption deterrence through the discipline of offenders’, the role of a Royal Commission of Inquiry can contribute towards eliminating some underlying causes of corruption and may even ‘enhance spiritual or faith-based connectedness and positive interaction’. The inquiries provide for strategic moves because in-depth ‘analysis of failure’, brings about ‘innovation’ and the ‘diagnosis of shortcomings,’ result in ‘meaningful change’. Moreover, having an open inquiry combined with the role of the media ‘as the chief means of contact with the unseen environment’, can bring about enhanced perception of shame and scandal; and the degree of shame can be related to professional pride. Nevertheless, Sherman warns that ‘while scandal ordinarily realigns the structure of power in an organization by replacements and shifts in the top echelon of administration and by their reform strategies, the new structure may be no more stable than one it replaces since the causes of instability are endemic to an organization and its environment.’ Hence, for Sherman, ‘much depend...on what policies are selected to control misconduct’. The Police, however, ‘having its own autonomous existence’, requires appropriate leadership to enhance its ‘collective consciousness and representations’, bearing in mind its nature of being ‘a whole composed of parts’ as well as the need for ‘disciplinary measures and control’.

Scandal and shame may be the intended impact behind the demand for a Commission of Inquiry into the recent death in prison of Carl Williams, ‘a prominent underworld figure’. Major newspapers called upon the Premier of Victoria to institute a Commission of Inquiry to delve deep into ‘the complex connections between corrupt police and other public officials, underworld violence, and those in the wider society who are the beneficiaries of corruption’. Since the work of a Commission of Inquiry is open to the public, the inquiry can provide the opportunity for the public ‘to know what connections there may be between police or former police and organised crime figures’. Sherman further contends that:

‘Defining criminal conduct by public officials as corrupt conduct rather than as criminal conduct is in itself symbolic. Investigation into “police corruption” rather than into “criminal police officers” symbolizes a public willingness to regard criminal and other forms of misconduct by public officials simply as criminal matters that require criminal sanctions. It is not the misdeed of officials that are corrupt but that such behavior by persons in their public role is a misuse of power and authority that is a matter of public trust in public organizations.’

And ‘scandal being a symbolic public reaction to an organizational breach of trust’ it can also shape public opinion about the policies ‘selected to control misconduct,’ expose existing subculture and, if it exists, the environment of ‘frustration, disappointment depression, and fear’.

In Australia, Royal Commissions gained momentum in 1980s when Justice Edward William delivered his findings on Drug Trafficking, identifying Sydney as ‘the centre of $59 million heroin trade’ and ‘also found weaknesses in costal surveillance and customs’. This was followed by Frank Costigan’s Joint Federal Victorian Royal Commission established to investigate the Federated Ship, Painters and Dockers Union, money laundering an drug trafficking. The investigation later included the Nugan Hand bank, known to be ‘linked with money laundering and drugs’. These investigations certainly left a blueprint of anti-corruption culture, highlighting the extent of underworld crime in Australia. The impact of those powerful Royal Commissions was that ‘in the years to come, the various royal commissions exposed a world of corruption few Australians realised existed. The late Kerry Packer was enmeshed in the P&D inquiry. Another result was the introduction of legislation, the Crimes (Taxation Offences) Act 1980, which put an end to ‘bottom of the harbour’ schemes’. Overall, Royal Commissions, at least, have ‘latent function’, the capacity to ‘expose the cracks and wounds’ within the public institutions of the Police and government. The era of commissions of inquiry also highlighted the separation of powers in a liberal democratic system and the importance of imposing the rule of law against the tendency to subdue it, for the sake of greed.

Conclusion

Risks of corruption in the Police Force may not only relate to the working environment, subculture of ‘Code of Silence’ and accountability, but also to the nature and complexities of law enforcement and working conditions. Hence, reforms must be an ongoing process and the strategy for a successful reform needs to equate with reality of diverse police functions. This would help determine what resources should be invested in which department. Human resources trained over many years and with much-needed institutional memory, need to be cherished. Therefore, investing on human resources to lift their spirit and performance is of paramount importance. The popular media piece chosen for this essay highlights the symbiosis between the underworld and power politics and it underpins public trust on Royal Commissions. Hence, this essay emphasises the groundbreaking work of Justice Williams and the Joint Federal Victorian Royal Commission headed by Frank Costigan. The importance of police integrity and humility is stressed as being critical for institutional stability, so the need to nurture these traits as intrinsic part of police officer’s core values and beliefs. Beyond wealth, which does not add value to a police officer, there are the important elements of integrity, trust and respect one receives from others. These are assets for living with the sense of professional achievement and beyond. Adam Smith contends that ‘the love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose character and conduct we approve of, necessarily dispose us to desire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable sentiment to, and to be as amiable and admirable as those whom we love and admire the most’. Loving and admiring their institution as a uniquely important public asset and, in turn, valuing the prestige entrusted upon them to serve the public may, after all, be the most profound drive available to the Police to fight intrinsic corruption.

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[1] ibid

[2] Ibid

[3] ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] J Schultz, Reviving the Fourth State – democracy, accountability, and the media’ Cambridge University Press, UK, 1998

[7] Greg Stolz, ‘Queensland police tied to major drug trafficking’, The Courier Mail, February 3, 2010, accessed February 11, 2011, www.news.com.au/national/queensland-police-tied-to-major-drugtracfficking/story-e...

[8] Taleh Sayed & David Bruce, ‘Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition’, African Security Review, Vol.7, No.1, 1998, accessed February 10, 2011, www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/No1/SayedBruce.html

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid

[15] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Norton & Mary Norton (Eds.), Oxford University Press, 2001, Oxford, UK, pp.180 - 184

[16] Ian Munro, ‘Something rotten in the state of Victoria’, Sydney Morning Herald, April 24, 2010, accessed January 27, 2011, www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=1378054

[17] Paul Carter, ‘Lennon speaks at police corruption probe’, Sydney Morning Herald, March 25, 2009, accessed January 27, 2011, www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=433526

[18] Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Hubers, ‘Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement’, in Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Hubers (eds.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands, pp.3-34, 2002

[19] Ibid, p.4

[20] Stephen Schwenke, ‘Sectoral Synthesis’, in Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries- Strategies and Analysis, Bertram Spector (ed.), Kumarian Press, Inc., 2005, pp.164-5

[21] Emphasis in the original

[22] Ibid, p.4

[23] ibid, p5

[24] Rick Sarre & Tim Prenzler, ‘The Relationship Between Police and Private Security: Models and Future Directions’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminology, 24(1), 2000, p.15

[25] Ibid

[26] D Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society- a venture in social forecasting, Basic Book, inc., Publishers, New York, USA, 1973, p.13

[27] Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, ‘Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities’, The World Bank,, Washington, USA, December 2006

[28] Police Education Advisory Council, ‘Police for the Future: Review of Recruitment and Selection for the Queensland Police Service’, 1998, pp.x-xxx & 19-29

[29] G Cole, M Gertz & A Bunger, The Criminal Justice System- Politics and Policies, 9^th Ed., Thomson Wadsworth, USA, 2004, p.112

[30] Joel Miller, ‘Police Corruption in England and Wales: An assessment of current evidence’, Home Office, Home Office Online Report 11/03

[31] Ibid, p.iii

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Ibid

[35] ibid

[36] Ibid

[37] Tim Prenzler, ‘Is There a Police Culture?’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, 56(4):47-56, December 1997, p.48

[38] C Klockars, Sanja Ivkovich, William Harver and Maria Haberfeld, ‘The Measurement of Police Integrity’, Research Brief, National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, May 2000

[39] Ibid

[40] ibid

[41] Ibid, p.2

[42] O Wilson, Police Planning, Charles C Thomas Publisher, Illinois, USA, 1973, p.31

[43] Ibid

[44] Ibid

[45] C Klockers et. al., op. cit., May 2000

[46] Ibid

[47] Ibid

[48] Ibid

[49] ‘Barrister wanted to bribe police: ICAC’, Sydney Morning Herald, September 24, 2009, accessed February 11, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=751758

[50] Tim Newman, ‘Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons form the literature’, Police Research Series Paper 110, Research Development Statistics, Home Office, London, UK,1999

[51] See also Brown, J.M. & Campbell, E.A., “The Cultural Context”. Stress and policing: Sources and strategies’, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Pp.147-165, printed by Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, 2003, p.164

[52] Ibid, p.vi

[53] Ibid, p.30

[54] Ibid

[55] Ibid

[56] J Dombrink, ‘The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke University School of Law, California, USA, 1988

[57] S Schwenke, 2005, p.164

[58] S Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government – Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.25

[59] Ibid

[60] Ibid

[61] A Sen, The Idea of Justice, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Massachutes, USA, 2009, p.7

[62] J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.12

[63] Ibid

[64] A Sen, The Idea of Justice, , 2009, p.7

[65] S Schwenke, 2005, p.165

[66] Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, New York, USA, 1968 pp. 186-187

[67] P Hurst, ‘Statism, Pluralism and Social Control’, in Criminology and Social Theory, David Garland & Richard Sparks (eds.), Oxford University Press, UK, 2000, p.128-9

[68] Ibid, p.183

[69] ‘A necessary public inquiry’, Sydney Morning Herald, February 8, 2010, accessed February 11, 2011, www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=1099960

[70] Ibid

[71] Less Kennedy, ‘AFP battles to conceal corruption allegations’, Sydney Morning Herald, July 18, 2010, accessed February 11, 2011, www.smh.com.au/national/afp-battles-to-conceal-corruption-allegations-20100717-1...

[72] Ibid

[73] Ibid

[74] Ibid

[75] C Klockars et. al, May 2000, op.cit., p.1

[76] Ibid

[77] Ibid

[78] L Miller, K Hess & C Orthmann, Community Policing –Partnership for Problem Solving, 6^th Ed., Delmar Cengage Learning, California, USA, 2008, p.61

[79] J Skolnick & D Bayley, Community Policing- issues and practices around the world, US Department of Justice, USA, 1988, p.33

[80] W Lippmann, Public Opinion, Wilder publications, VA, USA, 2010, p.174

[81] Aaron Lazare, On Apology, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2005, p.114

[82] Lawrence Sherman, Scandal and reform: controlling police corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1978, p.xii

[83] Ibid

[84] E Durkheim, On Morality and Society, edited by Robert Bellah, The University of Chicago Press, Cicago, USA, 973, p.xix

[85] Ibid

[86] Ibid, p.xx

[87] M Findlay, S Odgers & S Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice, 3^rd Ed., Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 2007, p.28

[88] ‘Williams’ death needs independent inquiry’, Sydney Morning Herald, April 23, 2010, accessed February 11, 2011, www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=1373392

[89] Ibid

[90] Ibid

[91] L Sherman, 1978, op.cit, p.xii

[92] Ibid

[93] L Sherman, 1978, op.cit., p.xiii

[94] R Taylor, T Caety, D Loper, E Fritsh & J Liederbach, Digital Crime and Digital Terrorism, Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, USA, 2006, p46

[95] Ibid

[96] Holiday Edition, ‘1980 Cabinet Papers’, The Age, December 31, 2010 – January 1, 2011, p.10

[97] Ibid

[98] Ibid

[99] Ibid

[100] Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control – Crime, Punishment and Classification, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1987, p.262

[101] Ibid

[102] David Bayley, ‘It’s Accountability, Stupid!’, in K Bryett & C. Lewis (Eds.), Up-peeling Tradition: Contemporary Policing, MacMillan Education Australia Pty Ltd., pp. 124-140, Melbourne, Australia, 1994

[103] T Prenzler, December 1997, p.49

[104] A Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009, p.7

[105] A Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, UK, 2007, p.148